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This thesis evaluates the effect of fully-funded graduate education on the joint 
outcome of promote to Pay Grade 5 and screen for squadron command for fixed-wing, 
carrier-based aviator lieutenant commanders (Pay Grade 4) eligible for the Pay Grade 5 
board. Binomial logit models are estimated to examine the impacts of earning a graduate 
degree, the timing of the degree, and the technical specificity of the degree. The thesis 
finds no evidence that career progression at this critical point is harmed by acquiring a 
fully-funded graduate degree. Rather, the thesis finds significant positive effects on 
promote/screen for those officers earning advanced degrees at selected junctures. 
Logit model estimates show that aviators with fully-funded technical degrees 
earned one or more years after the Pay Grade 4 board are 24.3% more likely to 
promote/screen than aviators without graduate degrees. Additionally, officers who 
earned graduate degrees on their own time are 5.7% more likely to promote/screen than 
officers without graduate degrees. 
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"In a message to the fleet describing the results of a Commander 
Command Screen Board, the writer stated that the board selected officers 
based on war fighting and leadership skills, not on political prowess. 
Bottom line, all the new COs picked had a knife in their teeth. Simply put, 
take it one tour at a time and excel in the assignment at hand... 
Yes, it is important to continue to seek postgraduate and joint education, 
but not at the cost of honing your war fighting skills or providing support 
to our war fighting forces." 
~ RADM Gerry Hoewing, Head Detailer for the United States Navy. (Perspective, 1998). 
A.        BACKGROUND 
Undertaking a fully-funded postgraduate education is seen as a career neutral 
endeavor by the aviators in fixed-wing, carrier-based communities. Statements such as 
that by RADM Hoewing send a clear message that graduate education is nice to have, but 
line officers belong in operational billets. Graduate education as it exists in the Navy 
today is not specifically targeted to improving war-fighting skills or operational know- 
how. If it did, it would be training rather than education. This fundamental difference 
between operational requirements which rest in the here and now and the purpose of 
education which focuses on the future using the past and the present as a guide or means 
of analysis presents a dilemma for carrier aviators. The fundamental question this thesis 
seeks to answer is: "Does fully-funded, full-time graduate education hurt one's chances 
for promotion to Pay Grade 5 and screening for squadron command?" 
Aviation, more so than any other line community revolves around the "trigger- 
pulling" skills of the officers who operate and manage weapon systems in real-time. 
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When the opportunity to attend a full-time graduate program, such as those offered at the 
Naval Postgraduate School, arises at the officer's first shore tour, many carrier-based 
aviators prefer to remain close to their operational specialty. This is done through 
requesting a billet at the Fleet Replacement Squadron, a training squadron in Pensacola, 
or by seeking assignment to one of the various communities' weapons schools. All of 
these billets, while shore-based and not 'operational' still allow an officer to continue to 
fly and build his or her reputation in a community. Often, a two-year tour at the Naval 
Postgraduate School is followed by a disassociated sea tour. For aviators this means an 
additional two and one-half years out of the cockpit and away from their operational 
specialty. In short, a cost-benefit decision must be made from an officer's perspective on 
the value of advanced education to one's military career plus any long-term benefits for a 
possible follow-on career in the civilian sector for the individual officer. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the effects that postgraduate education 
may have on an officer's career. This thesis will further examine the career impacts of 
types of graduate education, the timing of completing a degree, and the technical 
specificity ofthat degree. The effects of earning a graduate degree on the officer's own 
time versus a fully-funded degree will be examined as well. 
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The scope of this thesis will include: (1) a review of aviation career paths; (2) a 
review of current policies concerning postgraduate education for Naval officers; and (3) 
an evaluation of explanatory variables that may predict promotion to Pay Grade 5 or 
command screen. The thesis will conclude with recommendations for future policies 
concerning advanced education and career planning for carrier-based pilots and naval 
flight officers, and recommendations for further research. 
The methodology used will consist primarily of estimating multivariate models of 
the impact of graduate education on an officer's career. The predicted probabilities of 
promotion/screen outcomes will be derived from binomial logit estimating models. 
D.        ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This study is organized into six chapters. Chapter II is a review of pertinent 
literature, including the human capital model (Becker, 1975) and other models of 
organizational composition, selection processes, and career progression for aviation 
officers. Chapter III is an in-depth discussion of career progression for fixed-wing, 
carrier-based aviators. The Navy's subspecialty system and types of graduate education 
programs currently available to naval officers are also discussed in this chapter. Chapter 
IV is a description of the database used in this thesis and includes a further discussion on 
the human capital model, its relation to graduate education in the Navy and to the 
promote/screen outcomes used in this thesis. Chapter V discusses descriptive statistics 
and logit model results and their relevance to the effects of fully-funded graduate 
education. Chapter VI concludes the thesis with a summary of significant findings, 
policy recommendations, and recommendations for further research. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
II.       LITERATURE REVIEW 
A.       HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY AND BENEFITS OF GRADUATE 
EDUCATION 
Human capital theory is a way of addressing, in economic terms, investment in 
people. Whether through training, education, or quality of life, human capital theory 
recognizes that individuals seek to improve their lot in life. There are costs and benefits 
associated with this type of investment, with factors similar to the costs and returns 
associated with physical capital. 
Human capital theory takes an economic approach towards investment in human 
beings through on-the-job training, education, information, and health. (Becker, 1962, 
p.9). The literature shows that various measures of individual productivity within a firm 
have been applied to this framework. Becker (1962, 1975) used salary and age-earnings 
profiles, where Wise (1975) suggested that promotion outcomes were a more valid 
measure of on-the-job productivity. Both methods seek to quantify productivity, as 
measured through a combination of ability and acquired skill. Human capital predicts a 
positive correlation between ability, education level, acquired skill and individual 
productivity over time (Wise, 1975). This section will address on-the-job training, 
general training, firm specific training, formal education, employee motivation and their 
relationship to investment made in human capital. General applications of human capital 
theory to fully funded postgraduate education (FFGE) will be incorporated throughout. 
For the purposes of this study, FFGE is a full-time, postgraduate education program 
where officers are completely removed from active participation in their warfare 
specialty. This distinction is made to differentiate officers with FFGE from officers who 
may obtain a graduate degree on their own time, in addition to performing the duties of a 
particular assignment. 
1.   On-The-Job Training 
"Many workers increase their productivity by learning new skills and perfecting 
old ones while on the job. On-the-job training, therefore, is a process that raises future 
productivity and differs from school training." (Becker, 1962, p.l 1) This is similar to the 
situation of most naval officers. Officers that select into a fully funded graduate program 
have undergone four or more years of perfecting their war fighting skills, many of which 
require actual experience to acquire. They have also gained experience in management 
and organizational skills. An opportunity cost of attending a fully funded program is the 
separation from the experiential environment. One hypothesis of this thesis is that 
because the Navy places such a premium on operational experience, extended separation 
from this environment may be viewed as detrimental to one's career. Certainly for the 
Navy, education imposes an opportunity cost through loss of personnel to man other 
critical war-fighting positions, and increases current expenditures in expectation of 
greater future returns. One study calculated that the cost of educating one officer at the 
NPS was over $106,000.] (Cymrot & Cavalluzzo, 1998). Individuals selected for FFGE 
are expected to show a future return to the Navy through increased retention, promoting 
This cost includes an officer's salary and cost of on base housing, in addition to traditional educational 
expenses. 
at a rate equal to their peers not receiving FFGE, filling future billets that require 
advanced education, and greater productivity in future assignments. 
2.   General Versus Firm-Specific Training 
General training refers to knowledge or skills acquired that apply equally well to 
both the firm providing it and a variety of other firms. This is the type of training 
received in most undergraduate degree programs, where skills in accounting, 
management, or even engineering may apply equally as well to a number of firms. 
Another good example of this would be the general training received in undergraduate 
military flight training, where the majority of the syllabus is geared towards basic air 
work and flying skills, which translate directly to skills used in civilian aviation. 
General training makes an individual attractive to a number of firms, and the 
question becomes, "Why would a rational firm provide general training?" (Becker, 1962, 
p. 13) The answer, according to Becker, is that firms would provide general training only 
if they did not have to bear any of the costs. The Navy deals with this problem logically 
by establishing minimum service commitments, designed to fill required positions and 
recoup initial outlays over time. In the words of Becker, "A contract, in effect, converts 
all training into completely specific training."(1962, p. 23) 
Specific training is training that increases productivity only in the firm providing 
it. (Becker, 1962). "Completely specific training can be defined as training that has no 
effect on the productivity of trainees that would be useful in other firms." A large portion 
of on-the-job training within the military can be considered firm-specific training. 
Consider the specialized skills of naval flight officers (NFO's). They possess the general 
skills of aviation, such as communications, navigation, and mission planning. However, 
their position within the aircraft does not involve actual control of the aircraft. Instead an 
NFO is a mission specialist, who fills such positions as bombardier, airborne radar 
controller, or electronic counter measures officer. Unlike those trained as pilots, the 
NFO's unique mission skills are of little use outside of military aviation. 
In discussion of investments in human capital, and specifically training, one must 
consider the future returns. In the case of a specifically trained naval officer, reducing 
turnover (increasing retention) is in the Navy's best interest because his or her skills are 
not immediately replaced, and require continued outlay to fund the training for a 
replacement. Reducing turnover of specifically trained personnel is not patronage, but 
necessary to maintain and improve the firm's overall productivity. (Becker, 1962, p. 20). 
Becker asserts that employees with specific training have less incentive to leave an 
organization, and conversely, organizations have less incentive to fire them, when 
compared to employees with general training only. 
3.   Education as a Form of Training 
When an organization controls either a product or an occupation, training that is 
specific to these ends becomes firm-specific training. Such is the case for graduate 
education provided by the NPS.   In this condition, schooling and work are 
complimentary. "The development of certain skills requires both specialization and 
experience and can be had partly from firms and partly from schools." (Becker, 1962, 
p.25). In fact, one of the characteristics of a quality postgraduate education program is 
one that uses the practical experience of an individual as a baseline for increasing 
knowledge. (Cavalluzzo & Cymrot, 1998). The specificity of the degree programs and 
their relationship to the Navy subspecialty systems, seeks to provide a real-time, military 
relevant education. In fact, the courses at the NPS often apply civilian methods of 
operation and theoretical frameworks to topics of concern for military students (Gates, 
Maruyama, Powers, Rosenthal, & Cooper, 1999). Part of the gain realized by the Navy 
occurs when these officers return to the fleet with a fresh set of ideas and sharpened 
analytical skills. 
But individuals do not undertake formal schooling without some degree of risk to 
future returns. Implicit in an individual's decision to undertake formal education are both 
the immediate costs, and value of future returns. 
The immediate costs are the sum of the direct costs of education (books, tuition, 
fees, housing, etc.), and the indirect costs, such as the earnings foregone and time that 
could have been spent doing other things. For individual naval officers in FFGE, the 
direct costs of schooling are not a significant factor. Officer's continue to earn their 
salary, and in the case of the NPS, are provided on-base housing. However, the 
opportunity cost is the forgone experience in their warfare specialty. Choosing fully 
funded graduate education means officers must absorb two years of 'non-competitive' 
fitness reports; whereas their contemporaries who took shore-duty billets involving flying 
enjoy the dual benefit of remaining 'competitive' and maintaining operational 
proficiency. 
The future returns of graduate education take the form of increased wages, 
promotions, and/or broadened opportunity. A naval officer who undertakes fully funded 
graduate education can be said to value the benefits of future earnings in the civilian 
sector, or the possibility of future promotions in the Navy. Arguably the Navy has 
reduced its risk in providing graduate education by sponsoring its own graduate school, 
screening applicants for not only academic ability, but also future promotability, and by 
obligating officers to additional service after completion of a degree. 
Both the individual and the firm realize benefits from graduate education. The 
individual realizes a return in the form of increased critical thinking skills and problem- 
analysis capabilities (Gates, et al, 1999) that serve officers and the Navy throughout their 
careers. Another benefit is increased employee motivation. The possibility for increased 
future earnings or promotion, has a motivating effect on individuals. Motivation is 
difficult to measure, but its effect on productivity is unquestionable. Overall productivity 
does not depend solely on ability and the amount of time and money invested in training 
an employee. However, the combination of company investment and employee 
motivation can have a direct and positive effect on quality and productivity within the 
organization. 
B.        INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS, SCREENING, AND SELF-SELECTION 
The following section addresses characteristics of individual behavior and 
organizational structure that affect graduate education within the naval service. 
An internal labor market (ILM) is classified as a firm with limited points of entry, 
where positions are filled through selection and promotion of individuals already in the 
firm (Oswald, 1984; Rosen, 1992). Essentially, workers within an ILM have some 
probability of promotion to higher positions within the firm, with a corresponding 
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increase in wages. Doeringer and Piore (1971) first classified ILM's in 1966, to classify 
economies internal to a large organization. They argued that ILM's develop in 
competitive markets where specific skills are required and where on-the-job training is an 
essential element of acquiring skills. These characteristics apply to naval aviation, where 
aviation-specific skill sets are developed by the Navy in undergraduate flight training and 
refined through operational experience. Within aviation, the initial focus is on 
acquisition of technical skills. Much time and money is spent to train a naval aviator. 
Conversely, while managerial duties account for the majority of an aviator's duties in the 
fleet, these skills are learned primarily through on-the-job experience.   An additional 
component of ILM's is that "work rules become customary through repetition" 
(Doeringer & Piore, 1971, p. 39) and as such acquire the status of theory-in-use (Schein, 
1997.) 
Oswald (1984) and Rosen (1992) address several reasons for the existence of 
internal labor markets. First, some types of production require that some workers watch 
and direct, while others work. Secondly, within this internal market, workers gain 
experience and knowledge from producing a product. This provides an experienced pool 
of lower-level workers that the firm may draw from to fill supervisory positions. Thirdly, 
through observation of the workers on the job, current ability and future potential within 
that industry can be assessed. Essentially, this close observation serves as another form 
of screening individuals for higher positions (Oswald, 1984; Rosen, 1992). 
In his analysis, Oswald (1984) arrives at three conclusions. The first is that within 
internal labor markets, seniors are paid more than juniors. If the wage structure decreased 
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with seniority, it would become more difficult to fill senior positions, since workers 
would leave halfway through a career to move to an employment sector that paid wages 
independent of age. Second, some seniors and juniors may be paid more than the 
marginal value of their product. This, in turn, raises the supply of young recruits who 
find the probability of future returns attractive. Finally, within his analysis he asserts that 
workers can quit if they are not promoted. 
Finally, Lazear (1995) offers a new methodology for analysis of internal labor 
markets. While acknowledging the usefulness of human capital theory for analyzing 
rates of return to the labor side of the market, Lazear suggests that a jobs-based analysis 
may answer such questions as, "What are the characteristics of jobs that lead to 
promotion?" or "Do jobs (as opposed to workers in them) display different turnover 
behavior?" (1995, p. 260). Lazear states that certain jobs could act as 'ports of entry' into 
which virtually all workers were hired. All higher-level jobs in this type of market were 
only available to workers who had filled these entry positions. This study includes as 
part of its hypothesis that key billets exist, prior to the Pay Grade 5 reviews, that act as 
portals of entry (Lazear, 1995) to higher positions within the Navy. For aviation those 
portals of entry would be completion of undergraduate flight training and successful tours 
as a division officer, followed by a successful tour as a department head. This is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter III. 
The system in which military officers work can be considered an internal labor 
market, marked by a hierarchical structure, that promotes from within. Officers serve in 
operational assignments where they hone the skills of their specific warfare specialty and 
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the execution of their production duties are continually assessed and quantified by their 
immediate supervisors. Working within this structure, all fully qualified officers are 
promoted to Pay Grade 3, with the first up-or-out point coming at an officer's review for 
promotion to Pay Grade 4, at approximately the ten-year point in a typical career. 
Officers make decisions on continuation based on an assessment of periodic reviews 
(fitness reports), promotion rates for their particular year group, and myriad of other 
factors, which are beyond the scope of this thesis. However, if an officer fails to promote 
to the next higher Pay Grade, his or her time in grade is restricted by law, and that officer 
must eventually seek employment in the civilian sector. (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). 
Screening involves a firm's action in selecting individuals for employment, 
positions, or special programs. Common examples of screens are basic educational 
requirements, required skill sets, or even fees (Gausch & Weiss, 1981; Salop & Salop, 
1976). Self-selection in this case is a term used to describe individual behavior in 
response to organizational controls and individual tolerance for risk. 
An important point to remember when discussing screens within an ILM is that 
individuals are assessed over various time intervals and only the most able individuals are 
selected for choice assignments and/or promotion to the next highest position. (Rosen, 
1992). It is difficult to measure productivity in a military organization using monetary 
terms because pay scales are fixed according to rank. However, Rosen (1992) and a 1991 
Army study on organizational structure (Jacobs & Jaques, 1991) assert that rank or 
position is a valid measure of productivity. This is because of the far-reaching effects of 
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decisions made at higher levels in the organization.2 The increased responsibility at 
higher positions necessitates screens to ensure the viability of the organization. 
Screens tighten as officers achieve higher ranks (Rosen, 1992) partly due to the 
decision horizon discussed earlier, and also because of the increase in responsibility 
associated with higher ranks. These screens consider not only performance potential, but 
also motivation of an officer to realize that potential. (Rosen, 1992). 
Self-selection occurs when organizational actors are not ambivalent to these 
screens, but rather react and adjust their behavior in expectation of passing through a 
screen to the next level in the organization. The important thing to realize is that officers 
may tend to respond to perceptions of what the organization values, rather than what is 
stated or published. This thesis seeks to quantify the behavior of the organization in 
reaction to graduate education through indirect analysis of the perceived opportunity cost 
of time away from one's operational community. 
The Navy screens officers into FFGE based on promotability, derived from past 
work experience, and educational background.3 In the case of academic qualifications, 
officers must meet a minimum standard. However, past performance is the prime 
consideration for community detailers. Industry uses screens to ensure that jobs are filled 
by people with the skills to be productive in those positions. Other considerations are 
2
 Executive Leadership. One part of this study asserted that the time span to identify a cause and effect 
relationship between a decision and its effects increases with rank. For example, the time horizon for a 
decision made by an officer at Pay Grade 3 was 3+ months. General officers' decisions were found to 
affect actions up to 10 years after the decision point. 
3
 OPNAVINST 1520.23B, Subj: GRADUATE EDUCATION. 1 October 1991. 
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how trainable an individual is, and their likelihood of staying with the firm. (Salop & 
Salop, 1976). The Navy is concerned with future returns from its officers, so part of the 
contract for FFGE involves an additional service obligation. 
It was stated previously that self-selection is a behavior by the individual in 
response to organizational controls. Self-selection has also been characterized as a 
pricing scheme used by a firm to ensure only qualified individuals apply for positions. 
(Salop & Salop, 1976). The behavioral side is when the individual honestly reacts to an 
offer after weighing the costs and benefits. Assuming that our naval aviators are 
somewhere between risk-neutral and risk-averse, then only those officers that expect 
future returns to equal or exceed current costs will select into fully funded graduate 
education. This thesis asserts that there is a high degree of self-selection involved in the 
FFGE decision for aviators. This is due to the opportunity costs associated with a tour 
away from flying and its perceived effects on one's career. From the perspective of the 
Navy, the increased service obligation, screening for promotability (potential prolonged 
service beyond obligation), and screening for minimum academic qualification serve as 
market controls. This helps to ensure that only motivated individuals, who believe they 
will benefit from FFGE will select into such a program. 
To summarize, screening and self-selection help to ensure that only a certain kind 
of individual will enter into a fully funded degree program. Officers gain an advanced 
degree that not only benefits their future service, but also helps them when they 
eventually enter the civilian sector. The Navy realizes a return on officer retention 
(Cavalluzzo & Cymrot, 1998) and officers with increased analytical and problem-solving 
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skills. (Gates, et al., 1999). This thesis seeks to provide officers empirically determined 
information on the probability of realizing a future return on graduate education; 
essentially quantifying how the Navy values graduate education within a homogeneous 
group. 
C.        RELEVANT PAST STUDIES 
This section will review several studies that have addressed graduate education 
and its returns to earnings and future productivity. Additional studies examine the role 
played by graduate education in the military in general, and in the Navy specifically. 
1.   A Multivariate Analysis of the Effects of Academic Performance and 
Graduate Education on the Promotion of Senior U.S. Navy Officers 
This master's thesis by T. A. Buterbaugh (1995) analyzed the effects of 
undergraduate grades and fully funded graduate education on promotion to commander 
(Pay Grade 5) and captain (Pay Grade 6) in the Navy. The dataset consisted of naval 
officers from all warfare communities and fleet support communities who appeared 
before the commander and captain boards between 1981 and 1994. Probabilities for 
promoting to these ranks were analyzed using ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
maximum likelihood logit models 
In measuring the effects of education on officer promotion, Buterbaugh evaluated 
data from three time periods. The first, from 1981 to 1990, analyzed probabilities prior to 
the mandated reduction in force. The second, from 1990 to 1994, was analyzed to 
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measure the effects during the actual drawdown. Thirdly, he pooled the period from 
1981-1994. 
This study separated officers into five warfare communities: surface, subsurface, 
pilot, naval flight officer, and support. This accounted for differences between the 
various unrestricted line communities, as well as differences between staff and warfare 
communities. 
Buterbaugh (1995) found that for all officers appearing before the commander 
promotion board, FFGE increased the chances of promotion from 8.4% in the pre- 
drawdown period to 9.8% in the post-drawdown period. Those officers designated as 
scholars (undergraduate GPA greater than 3.2) were 6.7% more likely to promote. 
Higher probabilities of promotion were observed for officers who were "male, white, 
graduates of the USNA, are married, or have at least one dependent child." (Buterbaugh, 
1995, p. 26). Officers with prior enlisted experience, and officers with degrees in math- 
intensive or engineering-related undergraduate majors were less likely to be promoted by 
14.1 % and 1.1 %, respectively. 
For the captain data set, graduate education lost its significance in the promotion 
equation during both periods. Undergraduate academic performance, attendance at the 
USNA, and having dependent children were all positive and significant. Prior enlisted 
status was significant and negative for promotion to 0-6. 
The parameter estimates for promotion to commander for the pooled time period 
found that only surface warfare and fleet support officers benefited from FFGE. Surface 
warfare officers and fleet support officers with FFGE had an increased likelihood of 
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promotion to commander of 13.5% and 23.4%, respectively. Of the pilots eligible for 
promotion to commander, whites, those with high undergraduate grades (>3.2), USNA 
graduates, married officers, and those having at least one dependent child were more 
likely to promote in the pre-drawdown period. Those with FFGE were more likely to 
promote, but the effect was not significant. Prior enlisted service, and technical 
undergraduate majors had statiscally insignificant coefficients. For naval flight officers, 
being a USNA graduate, and having at least one dependent child had a positive and 
significant effect in promotion. FFGE, prior enlisted service, and technical undergraduate 
major has an insignificant effect. 
Buterbaugh's thesis demonstrated the aggregate positive effects of undergraduate 
academic achievement and graduate education on promotion to commander and captain. 
He did discover variations in this effect, however, for different warfare communities and 
during different time periods. When analyzing data on separate warfare communities, 
only surface warfare and fleet support showed significant (and positive) effects for 
graduate education on promotion to commander. Undergraduate achievement was 
significant and positive for pilots at the commander promotion board. 
The Buterbaugh study is fairly comprehensive in its analysis of the effects of 
FFGE on the various restricted and unrestricted line communities in the Navy. However, 
his treatment of communities may miss some of the effects of selection, community 
values, and differences between sub-cultures within a specific community. 
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2.   The Impact of Fully-Funded Graduate Education and Resident JPME on 
Aviator Promotion and Command Selection. 
This master's thesis by M. S. Orzell (1998) analyzes the effects of graduate 
education and resident joint professional military education (JPME) on aviator promotion 
and command screen outcomes. This study uses 0-5 and 0-6 promotion history files 
from fiscal years 1986 to 1994.4 Orzell restricted his data set to include officers that 
appeared before the 0-5 and 0-6 promotion boards due to the limited number of officers 
that had received Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) as 0-4s. He also 
restricted the dataset to include only naval pilots and naval flight officers due to their 
similar training requirements and similar career paths. 
The thesis examined the effects of JPME and fully funded graduate education 
during two time periods. The first was from 1986 to 1990. The second was from 1990 to 
1994. This was to assess the effects of the two programs both before and after the 1990 
mandated reduction in force to see if there was any change in promotion or command 
screen outcomes. OrzelPs study incorporated two new variables, which classified 
officers who held good jobs, as measures of officer performance. Orzell identified 
several key positions in Pay Grade 3 and Pay Grade 4 that he hypothesized would have a 
positive effect on an officer's fitness report.5 
4
 Dr. William R. Bowman of the USNA constructed the original dataset. 
5
 Examples of good division officer jobs were Training Officer and Quality Assurance Officer. Good 
department head jobs were defined as the Maintenance Officer and/or the Operations Officer. 
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a.   Promotion to Commander Results 
For promotion to commander in the pre-1990 dataset, FFGE was positive 
and significant, increasing the likelihood of promotion to commander by 6.0%, holding 
all other variables constant.   However, the impact of FFGE in the post-1990 dataset was 
insignificant. JPME was significant and positive in its effects on promotion to 
commander for both periods. In both periods, pilots were more likely to promote to 
commander. Pilots were also more likely to attend FFGE and receive JPME (Orzell, 
1998). It is interesting to note that the two variables for 'good division officer jobs' and 
'good department head jobs' were insignificant in both periods. 
b.   Command Screen Results 
Orzell's logit model only analyzed those commanders who stayed to the 
captain promotion board. The author acknowledges this model may not capture the true 
effects of FFGE or JPME on command screen, due to the selection bias introduced by 
officers who might choose to leave the Navy after a tour as a squadron commanding 
officer. This model found that FFGE was negative in both periods, but the effect was 
only significant in the pre-FY90 period. Being a pilot had a positive and significant 
effect on command screen in both periods. The good job department head variable 
becomes significant and positive in this model for both periods, indicating the value of 
holding key positions on screening for command. 
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c.   Promotion to Captain Results 
Orzell found that having held a squadron command billet was the only 
variable significant and positive for both time periods in explaining 0-6 promotion 
outcomes. The pre-FY90 model found that percent of times recommended for 
accelerated promotion on 0-5 fitness reports and having served as a squadron commander 
were positive and significant predictors of promotion to captain. The effects of FFGE 
and JPME are insignificant for both periods. 
Orzell used the notional person technique to calculate the marginal effects 
of various variables on performance outcomes. The commander model showed that 
FFGE increased the likelihood of promoting to 0-5 by 6.0% in the pre-FY90 period, 
holding all other variables constant. Receiving JPME increased the chances by 6.8% and 
7.9% for the pre- and post-FY90 periods, respectively. Marginal effects of the command 
screen model showed that filling the 'good department head jobs' increases the chance of 
promotion by 17.5% to 20.0% for the periods analyzed, and that FFGE decreased the 
chances of screening by -6.4% to 4.4%, pre and post-FY90 respectively. One interesting 
finding is that pilots were shown to have a distinct advantage over naval flight officers at 
the command screen board by just over 17% in both periods. For the promotion to 
captain model, only a variable indicating previously having a command tour was 
significant; it increased the likelihood of promotion to captain by 81.9 percent. The 
author acknowledges that a large part of the variation in the model is dominated by this. 
result. 
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Orzell's approach to assessing the effects of graduate education has several unique 
aspects. He has sorted the data to include a group of people with similar entry-level 
training. This sorting also accounts for differences in the opportunity costs of fully 
funded graduate education between warfare communities. His model builds on the 
Buterbaugh (1995) thesis but includes an analysis of the effects of the drawdown in the 
early 1990's and incorporates variables for key billets in the organization. Although not 
designated as such, his variables for good jobs seem to act as proxies for ability and 
motivation and address a key difference in the detailing procedures between aviation and 
the other unrestricted line communities. This thesis did not consider the timing or 
utilization of graduate education. Orzell suggests that distinction between the land-based 
maritime patrol, rotary-wing, and tactical aviation communities may reveal different 
results. The model for command screen used data from officers who had appeared before 
the captain promotion boards. It is possible that this method does not account for officers 
that filled commanding officer billets and then chose to leave the Navy. A possible effect 
of this specification is that the effects of graduate education on command screen may be 
understated. 
3.   Graduate Education and Employee Performance: Evidence from 
Military Personnel. 
This study by Professors William Bowman and Stephen Mehay (1999) analyzed 
the effects of a master's degree on the probability of promotion to Pay Grade 4 for naval 
officers. The dataset consisted of line (operational) and restricted line (staff) naval 
officers who were reviewed for promotion to Pay Grade 4 between 1985 and 1990, 
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representing officers who entered the Navy between 1976 and 1980. The dataset is 
similar to the dataset used in this thesis.6 
Bowman and Mehay used bivariate probit models to estimate the effects of 
graduate education on promotion. They used a human capital model that defined an 
individual's promotion probability as a function of the aggregate promotion rate for a 
given year, the individual's effort and ability, and the efforts and abilities of all others in 
the same Pay Grade. Initial unadjusted promotion differentials showed that line officers 
and staff officers with a master's degree promoted at rates 10 and 14 percent greater than 
officers without degrees respectively. 
For line officers in this study, bivariate probit models without controls for ability 
or job performance showed that the effects of a fully funded degree increased the 
likelihood of promoting by 14.8 percent. Once controls for ability and performance were 
introduced to the model, effects of a degree for line officers were reduced by 5.5 percent. 
However, the coefficient still indicated that graduate education increased the likelihood of 
promotion by 7.4 percent. 
Separate estimates were run on the choice (or selection) to attend graduate school 
to better estimate the effects of graduate education and account for selection bias. 
Controls for different communities were included in the model, along with proxies for 
academic ability, early career performance, stated preference for graduate education, and 
individual characteristics such as age, gender, and minority status. Bowman and Mehay 
6
 Prof. Bowman compiled the original dataset for this thesis, with only minor modifications made by the 
author. 
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found that line officers, hypothesized to have the highest opportunity costs of attending 
fully funded education, were less likely to enter a fully funded program than staff 
officers. This led the authors to conclude that a large part "of the positive relationship 
between master's degrees and promotion were due to unobservable attributes [such as 
motivation] that lead some people to attend (or be selected for) graduate school.. .and to 
be more promotable." 
The Bowman-Mehay study provides a positive evaluation of graduate education 
in the Navy. However, several issues that may affect the returns to graduate education 
were not considered. The first is inherent differences between career paths (e.g., time-to- 
train) of specific line communities. The timing, technical specificity, and utilization of a 
degree are not addressed by this study. Finally, promotion to Pay Grade 4 is a good 
intermediate measure of productivity, but does not address the time period where officers 
would apply the skills acquired through a master's degree in their respective 
communities. This study provides a framework for analysis of graduate education in the 
Navy and allows for further, more community-specific research. 
4.   A Bottom-Up Assessment of Navy Flagship Schools 
The Center for Naval Analyses (Cymrot & Cavalluzzo, 1998) evaluated the 
effectiveness of the Navy's flagship educational institutions; namely, the United States 
Naval Academy, the Naval Postgraduate School, the Naval War College, and the Armed 
Forces Staff College. The study was undertaken to address the future ability of the 
schools to provide top-quality education in the face of budgetary reductions and future 
force drawdowns. 
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The study first looked at key attributes of top-tier academic institutions, as 
determined by independent accreditation organizations and assessed the quality of Navy 
schools against those attributes. It also reviewed current and projected funding required 
to maintain a quality educational system and incorporated a comparison with other 
similar institutions, both in and out of the Department of Defense. The outcomes 
addressed, in terms of return on investment, are analysis of retention, utilization, and 
promotion of officers who participated in fully funded educational opportunities at these 
institutions. 
The primary analysis used unadjusted mean percentages of various outcomes. 
This method may capture raw data; however, it does not account for the interactions 
between key factors, such as differences in backgrounds, or variances in fiscal 
environments. 
This review will focus on the findings related to postgraduate education in the 
Navy. It will begin with the characteristics of top-tier institutions to address what people 
are expecting from top-notch graduate education. Secondly, the issue of how the navy 
realizes a return on its investment in human capital through utilization, retention, and 
promotion will be addressed. This section will conclude with the recommendations on 
the NPS's graduate program format, follow-on utilization of officers, and implications for 
the future of advanced education within the Department of the Navy. 
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a.   Characteristics of Top-Tier Educational Institutions and The Naval 
Postgraduate School 
Cymrot contrasted the accreditation process and requirements to arrive at 
several indicators of quality postgraduate education. According to the Center for Naval 
Analyses' research, quality graduate programs exhibit several of the following 
(Cavalluzzo & Cymrot, 1998, pp. 18-19): 
1) Unity of purpose among faculty, students, and administrators. 
.   2)  Cooperation and support among program participants. 
3) Rigorous program requirements, including core courses, intense immersion 
learning situations, hands-on learning experiences, and a substantial product, 
such as a thesis or final project. 
4) Institutional and departmental support. Specifically in the way of funding 
activities geared specifically towards the master's program, vice institutional 
research, doctoral programs, or undergraduate studies. 
5) Faculty involvement 
6) Committed students with diverse backgrounds and experiences. The study 
defines good students less in terms of academic qualifications than in level of 
commitment and motivation to enhance the overall educational experience. 
7) Strong program leadership. The authors classified this as a management 
approach that values diversity, makes the most of resources, is skilled at 
recruiting and retaining top-notch faculty. 
The NPS was determined to exhibit several of these qualities but one must 
recognize that the NPS is different from other institutions that offer advanced education. 
First and foremost, NPS is a stand-alone, graduate institution that: 1) specializes in 
graduate education, 2) is focused on a curriculum that offers firm-specific education to 
support the sub-specialty requirements of the Navy, and 3) is targeted to mid-careerists, 
five or more years removed from academia, but who have gained much in the way of 
practical leadership, management, and technical skills. It is from this framework that 
Cavalluzzo and Cymrot chose their performance outcomes. These were: 1) Utilization 
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rates in designated billets, 2) Continuation rates of graduates, 3) Selection to advanced 
ranks and, 4) Representation at flag rank. 
The first outcome was the utilization rate of graduates. The study looked 
at all naval officers, without regard to community. It found that while 67 percent of 
graduates served a utilization tour, only 30 percent filled a billet that exactly matched 
their subspecialty, and that a substantial amount of time had passed between completion 
of the degree and utilization. 
Continuation rates and promotion were chosen as the second outcome. 
The study found that NPS graduates were more likely to stay in the Navy and also more 
likely to promote to Pay Grade 4 than officers without graduate degrees. 
Finally the study found that as of September, 1996; 80% of flag officers 
had a master's degree or higher. However, only 28% of flag officers had received their 
degree from NPS. 
b.   C.N.A. 's Recommendations 
The authors assert that given the infrequent assignment to matching billets, 
that a more generalized postgraduate education may be more effective for meeting the 
advanced education requirements of naval officers. The outcomes of less firm-specific 
advanced education would be a reduction in costs associated with curriculum 
development and maintenance. 
They also suggest that the Navy could reduce the level of detail in defining 
the sub-specialty requirements (which in turn drive curricula composition). More 
generalized requirements would allow for greater consideration of civilian alternatives 
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and introduce competition, providing incentives for the Naval Postgraduate School to 
find more efficient alternatives for providing advanced education. 
It is interesting to note that the authors suggest a "Master of Science in 
Military Management and Technology" that would offer a curriculum more tailored to the 
immediate needs of its graduates. One such program currently exists, run by the Naval 
Postgraduate School, at the United States Naval Academy. A small group of officers 
receives one year of intensive instruction, earning a Master of Science in Leadership and 
Human Resources Development. At the completion of the degree, these officers 
immediately serve as company officers at the Naval Academy, completing their 
utilization tour and giving practical application to newly acquired skills. 
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III.  CAREER PROGRESSION AND GRADUATE EDUCATION 
This chapter will discuss the career progression of fixed-wing, carrier-based naval 
aviators and conclude with a review of the graduate education system in the Navy. A 
naval career is a finite event, even for those who reach the highest levels of the military 
hierarchy. An officer within this system must promote, or eventually accept retirement or 
separation. Accessions into naval aviation occur primarily at entry-level positions, with a 
small amount of accessions occurring through early transfers of junior officers from other 
naval communities. This being said, a career within naval aviation follows a predictable 
course, with some time-to-train differences between carrier-based, land-based maritime 
patrol, and rotary-wing communities. This chapter will address the career progression of 
fixed-wing, carrier-based aviators, officer fitness report evaluations, promotions, and 
screening for command of a squadron. The second part of this chapter will address the 
graduate education system in the Navy as it exists today. 
A.        CAREER PROGRESSION 
Initial entry into the aviation community is based on strict physical standards and 
a combination of academic achievement and batteries of aptitude tests. Applicants may 
not be older than 27 years of age upon acceptance to the flight program. The flight 
program is extremely competitive. An officer that receives less than 80 percent on a 
ground school test, or fails to perform satisfactorily on a flight event, receives a failure, or 
a 'down'. The current standard is three failures and out. For the period 1988-1992, the 
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overall attrition rate for Navy and Marine Corps pilots was 20.3 percent.1 Flight students 
desiring to fly fixed-wing aircraft2 from the decks of aircraft carriers face high levels of 
competition throughout undergraduate flight training. Only those students with the 
highest ratings are permitted to select carrier-based aircraft. 
Aviators spend a large portion of their early career in various training squadrons 
to acquire the skill sets necessary to operate complex machinery in a dynamic 
environment. Throughout the world of aviation, no environment is more complex than 
operating from the decks of an aircraft carrier. As such, training pipelines for naval 
aviators selected for carrier duty are longer than those selected for land-based maritime 
patrol or rotary-wing aircraft by one to four years.3 An aviation officer's career begins 
with approximately two years in undergraduate flight training, learning the basic skills of 
aviation. Pilots take about a year longer than naval flight officers, due to extra time in the 
pipeline devoted to learning how to land on an aircraft carrier. At the completion of 
undergraduate flight training, an aviator earns his or her gold wings and is designated a 
naval aviator or naval flight officer. The prospective fleet aviator4 is then sent to a fleet 
replacement squadron (FRS) to qualify in the operational aircraft of their new 
community. This is the first time an aviator operates an aircraft designed for war-fighting 
1
 See "Career Progression of Minority and Women Officers." Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 
August, 1999, p.53. 
2
 For the remainder of this study, the term 'carrier-based aircraft' will be used to represent the various jet 
communities as well as carrier-based propeller driven aircraft, i.e. the E-2C Hawkeye. 
3
 "Naval Aviation Production Process Improvement (NAPPI): Background/Talking Points." Available at 
<www.hq.navy.nüVAirwarfare/navysite/Talkmg%20Points%20for%20NAPPI%20032699.htm>. 
4
 The term 'aviator' refers to both pilots and naval flight officers unless specified otherwise. 
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use. Along with learning the various aircraft systems and weaponry, the pilots must also 
re-qualify aboard an aircraft carrier, and for the first time, qualify in night landings. Up 
to two months of dedicated preparation goes into this final certification for each pilot. 
Naval flight officers are exposed to the carrier for the first time during these qualification 
periods. At the completion of the FRS syllabus, about one year in length, aircrews are 
completely qualified to enter the fleet. Often they are immediately sent to meet 
squadrons already on deployment around the world. This process, when running at an 
optimal pace takes about three years for a pilot and two years for a naval flight officer. 
Realistically, there are many delays in the training pipelines and the time from 
commissioning to fleet squadron has taken as long as five years.5 
It is important to recognize that up to the point that officers join their first 
operational squadron, all of their training is application of cognitive skills. They are 
learning tasks and acquiring physical and mental skills that relate directly to the operation 
of aircraft. But when officers enter their first fleet squadron, they are expected to be 
naval leaders as well as aviators. It is at this point that their fitness report summaries 
begin to reflect the affective as well as cognitive skills of an officer. Affective skills can 
be thought of as those skills that enable a person to get along within the organization, 
such as leadership ability, motivational skills, and organizational skills. 
Table 3.1 shows a typical career path for aviation, recognizing that careers vary 
with each officer. The initial fleet squadron assignment is termed sea duty. Sea duty is 
5
 According to an analysis by the Thomas Group, Inc. as part of the Naval Aviation Production Process 
Improvement (NAPPI) program. Available at <http://navaltx.navy.mil/cnatra/>. 
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time spent in an operational command. During sea duty, squadrons typically deploy for 
six months at a time and work at an increased pace. After an officer spends two to three 
years on sea duty, it is now time for that officer to rotate to a billet in a command based 
ashore. This is termed shore duty. Prior to the first shore duty rotation, an officer must 
make a decision on what kind of shore duty to accept. Many billets, whether sea or 
shore-based have the potential to help, hinder, or hurt an officer's career. It is at this 
point that the first window of opportunity is available for an officer to pursue fully funded 
graduate education. Table 3.1 lists the sequence and lengths of the various sea and shore 
rotations available in a typical aviation career path. The length of time for sea duty is 
proscribed, due to the primacy assigned to filling war-fighting billets in sea-going 
commands. Shore tour lengths are recommended and highly flexible in their duration. 
This is evidence of the value the Navy places on operational tours and is in line with the 
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Note. From the U.S. Navy Officer Transfer Manual, Change 3-99, p. 3-13 
Note that the first opportunity for full-time graduate education comes around the 
six-year point. Subsequently, a utilization tour for that degree would occur at the 14-year 
point in a typical career (usually after the officer has completed a tour as a department 
head). 
The hierarchical structure of the military applies to naval aviation as well, and 
implies increasing levels of responsibility with each increase in an officer's rank (or Pay 
Grade). Reviews of officers' performance occur at fixed intervals and if performance is 
judged to be less than that required for future positions, an officer is not promoted. If an 
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officer twice fails to select for the next higher Pay Grade, then he or she must eventually 
leave the service. (Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Bowman & Mehay, 1999). 
1.   Periodic Reviews 
Selection boards review an officer's performance at various stages in a career. 
The Navy convenes selection boards to screen officers for promotion, special programs, 
or key positions. Promotion boards are established by law, with tight limits on 
percentages of officers that may be promoted. Administrative boards are used to select 
officers for special programs or key billets. 
Promotion to Pay Grade 2 and Pay Grade 3 are virtually automatic, as these 
officers are still in the initial phases of their career and make up the bulk of the 
operational force. The Navy's current policy on promotion to Pay Grades 2 and 3 is to 
promote all fully qualified officers. The Pay Grade 4 review, at roughly the ten-year 
point, is the first competitive review an officer faces. This is the first up-or-out review 
and if an officer does not promote, a career with the Navy is essentially over. At these 
boards, officers from the three major warfare communities (surface, submarine, and 
aviation) review an unrestricted line officer's performance record. This means that all 
unrestricted line officers are reviewed as a group. So a surface warfare officer may 
review an aviator's record when being considered for promotion. 
Administrative boards are used to select for special programs, such as test pilot 
school; or key positions, such as squadron command. In the case of the screen for 
squadron command, the board is composed of aviation officers only and occurs shortly 
after the Pay Grade 5 board is complete. Command screen boards occur each November. 
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Another form of an administrative board is the screen for funded graduate education. 
These are primarily ad hoc boards that select/screen officers for minimum academic 
qualifications and future promotion potential. 
2.   Fitness Reports 
Officers receive periodic evaluations (at least one per annum) of their 
performance by their immediate superiors. Officers receive an 'observed' fitness report if 
they have been closely observed for a majority of the time covered by a reporting period. 
They receive 'unobserved' reports for times not under close evaluation in an assigned 
billet, to provide for a day-to-day accounting of one's career. Time spent in various 
training and educational environments, such as flight school or in a full-time graduate 
education program are treated as unobserved time in an officer's career. 
Fitness reports are used to characterize an officer's performance. For the time 
period of this study, officers received letter grades in 14 different categories, ranging 
from managerial capabilities to warfare specialty skills. It was common practice for an 
officer to receive all A's in these categories, with the real distinguishing features between 
officers expressed in paragraph form on the back of the fitness report. Summary remarks 
stated accomplishments and achievements during the reporting period, as well as 
indications of future promotability and potential. Another discrimination element on the 
report was the officer's recommendation for promotion. This could be 'early,' 'regular,' 
or 'not recommended.' This recommendation, combined with the written summary, 
traditionally carried more weight than the often-inflated category grades. 
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This study uses percentage of times recommended for accelerated promotion in 
Pay Grade 3 (PRAP3) as an independent variable in the promote/screen equation. Only 
fitness report evaluations where officers were competitively ranked against their peers 
were considered valid when deriving the PRAP3 variable. Fitness reports received when 
detaching a command, any 1 of 1 ranking, and reports received while in training or 
schooling assignments were disqualified to ensure a more accurate representation of 
performance. 
The Navy uses highly centralized control for its promotion boards, and relies 
almost exclusively on the officer's fitness report when considering officers for promotion 
or special programs. However, much goes into a superior's evaluation of an officer, and 
commanding officers are careful to select only the most capable officers for key positions 
within their command. This especially applies to aviation squadron department heads, 
where an officer is generically assigned to a squadron. The commanding officer 
determines what billet within the squadron a department head will fill rather than an 
administrative board or a community detailer. This is a key difference from the surface 
warfare and submarine communities where officers are 'detailed' to specific department 
head positions. 
The fitness report contains quantified achievements in the summary, but the 
ranking is usually subjective on the part of the reporting senior. In essence, the entire 
fitness report is an evaluation of an officer's cognitive and affective skills and their 
relevance to current and future positions. 
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3.   Promotion Board Guidelines 
Department of Defense regulations dictate the percentages of officers that may 
promote, as well as the time in service that promotions should occur. Table 3.2 shows the 
guidelines as of June 1996. These percentages refer to aggregate of unrestricted line 
officers, and may vary by designator and specific warfare community (within aviation, 
Attack and Fighter are examples of two different communities.) 
Table 3.2 — Desired Active Duty List Promotion Timing and Opportunity 
TO GRADE 
Q-4 (Pay Grade 4) 
Q-5 (Pay Grade 5) 
TIMING1 
10 years +/-1 year 
16 years +/-1 year 






 Years of commissioned military service plus all entry grade credit. 
Note. From Department of Defense Instruction 1320.13, Enclosure 2, 
June 21, 1996. 
Once convened, promotion boards operate under directives that govern 
communications and items they may consider for review of an officer's record. For 
example, Boards are forbidden from considering an officer's marital status, or the 
"employment, education, or volunteer service of a spouse."6 Boards are directed to select 
officers using a "best and fully qualified" benchmark. Fully qualified means that an 
officer must be capable of performing at the next higher rank. Consideration is given to 
minority status; however, promotion quotas are not in effect. Boards are encouraged to 
acknowledge institutional barriers or decreased opportunities for minorities to hold key 
positions and again consider the actual performance and not the billet filled. The 
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following guidance on graduate education was given to the FY-01 Pay Grade 6 
promotion boards: 
"Post-graduate education and specialty skills, represented by proven 
subspecialties, are important to our Navy and represent a key investment 
in our future. The Navy needs officers with formal technical and military 
education in a time of increasing technological sophistication. Advanced 
education achievement is a significant career milestone in the development 
of future Navy leadership. The utilization of advanced education in 
subspecialty tours is an equally significant career milestone. In 
determining an officer's fitness for selection, you shall favorably consider 
graduate degrees, military education, and experience in specialized areas." 
(FY-01 Active Duty Officer Promotion Selection Board Guidance, 
Appendix B, p. 3).7 
Even with a strong statement to the board, there are no requirements to promote 
officers with graduate education at rates equal to their peers lacking graduate degrees. In 
contrast, for officers serving in designated Joint Duty Assignments, officers designated as 
Joint Specialty Officers, or officers serving in other joint assignments the board is 
encouraged to achieve promotion rates equal to officers serving in Navy staff positions. 
The difference is minor, but recommending a percentage to a promotion board sends a 
stronger message than a statement of validity. 
4.   Squadron Command 
The high point of any career traditionally is to be selected for command. It is to 
this end that a career-minded junior officer aspires. Command of a squadron represents 
6
 "FY-01 Active Duty Officer Promotion Selection Board Guidance." Available at 
<http://vvfww.bupers.navy.rnil/pers8/p85/p851/o6.htm>. 
7
 Available at <www.bupers.navy.mil/pers8/p85/p851/o6.htm>. 
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the culmination of an aviator's operational career. Selection is based on a summary 
review of an officer's performance and his or her current and future capabilities. Officers 
can expect to report to their command tour around the 17-year point in a career. The 
typical tour lasts from 24 to 36 months. Carrier-aviation handles the command screen 
differently from the surface or submarine communities. Officers are first screened for 
command, and then report to their squadron as the executive officer. Officers will first 
serve as executive officers for 12 to 18 months, then turnover with the current 
commanding officer and begin the actual command portion of their tour. 
Commanding officers of squadrons are the central point of authority and 
leadership for the 200 or more personnel entrusted to their care. For many carrier-based 
aviators, squadron command is their last tour in a billet that involves flying. Some post- 
squadron-command flight billets exist in the form of bonus commands, such as the 
commanding officer of the FRS, but these are rare. However, the majority of 
commanding officers go on to fill various senior staff and planning positions in the Navy. 
Essentially, squadron command is their last hands-on involvement in war-fighting billets. 
B.        SUBSPECIALTY MANAGEMENT 
Before any discussion of fully funded graduate education, one must first 
understand the structure of the current subspecialty system and its relationship to 
advanced officer education. The subspecialty system serves as justification for the 
various programs offered by the NPS. Some studies question the validity of the current 
system, due to the traditionally low utilization rates among URL officers (see for 
example: Cavalluzzo & Cymrot, 1998). The system as it currently exists does not capture 
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(nor does it attempt to capture) the effects of graduate education for officers. In the fleet, 
unrestricted line officers 'specialize' in their designated warfare positions. The yardstick 
these 'warrior' officers are measured by is their performance in sea-going, operational 
billets. The subspecialty system was never meant to capture the benefits a graduate 
degree may provide during operational tours, and as such cannot be expected to serve as 
full justification or rebuttal for the graduate education system. 
1.  Subspecialty System 
In the Navy, a subspecialty code (or P-code) designates expertise in an area other 
than one's primary occupational specialty. These subspecialty codes are tied to a set of 
educational skill requirements for a particular billet. For example, a billet for a 
comptroller may require an officer with a P-code of XX32 (Financial Management). 
There are numerous ways to earn a subspecialty code. The primary way is 
through completing a specified course of study at the Naval Postgraduate School, which 
results in the awarding of a P-code. Another way for officers to receive a subspecialty 
code is to serve in a billet that requires a specific subspecialty-designated skill. At the 
completion of assignment to that particular billet, the officer would earn an R-code, 
similar to the P-code designation obtained through postgraduate education. This occurs 
within critical billets, for which no P-coded officer is available for assignment. It is also 
possible to earn a P-Code if a degree completed on the officer's own time fulfills the 
educational skill requirements of a particular subspecialty. 
As stated previously, the NPS is the primary assignment activity for officer 
subspecialty codes. Each course of study at NPS has a DOD sponsor, which requires that 
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course's particular subspecialty code for various billets under their cognizance. By law, 
the NPS cannot offer a course of study unless it directly complements billets within the 
DOD. This is one of the reasons for the high-level of firm-specific education offered by 
the NPS. 
2.   Subspecialty Utilization 
According to the Officer Transfer Manual (OTM), upon completion of fully 
funded graduate education, an officer should be assigned to a utilization tour at the first 
opportunity. Currently the Navy interprets this to mean within two shore tours, whereas 
other services consider the two tours of duty immediately following completion of 
graduate education.   The assignment to a utilization tour is not to preclude assignment to 
key operational billets in order to meet career milestones such as department head, 
executive officer, or command tours. Following a FFGE tour, the assignment policy 
makes an allowance for aviators to meet flight time requirement gates by designating that 
assignment to operational tours should be Duty Involving Flight Operations (DIFOPS). 
This is to avoid penalizing officers for time out of the cockpit while undergoing FFGE. 
(OTM, 1999). 
Officers fulfill the requirement for a utilization tour by serving in a P-coded 
matching billet. A direct match is desired; however, numerous billets carry primary and 
"closely related" subspecialty designations. Additionally an officer may fulfill the 
requirement by serving in a "billet utilizing (an) officer's subspecialty in a billet that is 
not subspecialty coded," or serving in a billet with a "higher priority requirement." 
(Officer Transfer Manual, 1999, pp. 7-13). The Center for Naval Analyses found that as 
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of the fall of 1994, only 30% of unrestricted line officers filled a billet that exactly 
matched their subspecialty code. Another 21% filled a closely matching billet and an 
aggregate of 67% ever filled a subspecialty billet at all. (Cavalluzzo & Cymrot, 1998).8 
This thesis found the aggregate utilization rate among carrier-based fixed-wing 
aviators was only 38.5 percent. The point of measurement for utilization is prior to the 
Pay Grade 6 board, which would encompass the two sea-tour window. This figure calls 
attention to how difficult it may be to fit a utilization tour into a competitive career path. 
3.   Selection for Fully-Funded Graduate Education 
Each officer applying for FFGE is administratively screened and then reviewed by 
a board for selection to postgraduate education programs. Selection is based on 
"academic capability, outstanding professional performance, promotion potential, and a 
strong academic background."9 Academically, minimum standards are set for each 
course of study at the Naval Postgraduate School. It is to this end that the Navy uses the 
Academic Profile Code (APC) to characterize an officer's undergraduate grade point 
average, math ability, and technical qualifications (see Table 3.3). 
Table 3.3 — Academic Profile Codes 
APC1        Quality Point Rating Code 





° These percentages account for NPS graduates only. Other Navy sponsored graduate programs were not 
considered. 
9




APC2 Math Qualification Code 
0 Significant post-calculus math with B average 
1 2 or more calculus courses with B+ average 
2 2 or more calculus courses with C+ average 
3 1 calculus course with C grade or better 
4 At least 2 pre-calculus courses With B average or better 
5 At least one pre-calculus course with C grade 
6 No math with C grade 
APC3 Technical Qualification Code 
Lower Division 
Calculus-Based Physics 
Upper Division Courses in 
Engineering/Physical Science Major 
0 B+ average 
1 C+ average 
2 Complete sequence taken, B+ average 
3 Complete sequence taken, C+ average 
4 At least one course with C grade 
5 None 
   
Note. From the Manual of Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Classifications, Volume II, 1992 
The academic profile code (APC) maintained in an officer's service record is a 
three-digit code which describes overall undergraduate academic achievement, technical 
coursework performance, and technical specificity of academic major. Each Navy- 
funded graduate education program has a minimum APC requirement. For example, an 
officer desiring a master of science in aeronautical engineering requires a minimum APC 
of 3-2-3 for direct entry. This means the officer at a minimum requires a 2.60 
undergraduate grade point average, two or more calculus courses with a C+ average in 
those courses, and a complete sequence of lower division physics course with a C+ 
average. 
Only one program at the NPS requires an undergraduate grade point average 
greater than 2.20/4.00 (APC1 code less than 3) and that is for the Reactors/Mechanical 
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Engineering curriculum. It is important to note that the NPS is a school oriented to the 
needs of naval officers. Special programs address the fact that naval officers are adult 
learners, four or more years removed from an academic environment. If an officer's math 
or technical qualification code does not meet curricula direct entry requirements, or a 
significant period of time has elapsed since college, the school offers a six to twelve week 
"engineering science" refresher curriculum to prepare students for graduate level 
coursework. Figure 3.1 below groups officers by graduate degree status. The categories 
are NOGRAD, or officers without graduate degrees; PARTGRAD, or officers who 
obtained a graduate degree on their own time; FFNTECH for officers who earned a non- 
technical graduate degree in a full-time program; and FFTECH for officers who earned a 
technical graduate degree in a full-time program. When one compares the various AP 
codes of the officers in this study (see Figure 3.1 below), there is actually little 
differentiation from one group to the next. The surprising exception is for those officers 
selecting into the fully-funded non-technical programs (FFNTECH). These officers have 
better undergraduate grades, better math scores, and better technical ratings than any 
other comparison category (note that lower APC's are 'better'). 
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Figure 3.1 
The point to realize is that an officer does not need to be an engineer, or have a 
highly technical undergraduate background to successfully complete a graduate degree. 
These programs are designed for officers with proven performance in their operational 
specialties and offer a unique opportunity for expanded intellectual pursuits. 
4.   Obligation 
Upon completion (or termination) of the education program, officers obligate for a 
period of three years for the first year of graduate education and one month for each 
month thereafter. This obligation is served concurrently with any other obligations 
incurred, vice consecutively.10 On average, an officer will obligate for four additional 
10
 "Concurrent" means that the graduate education obligation may be served at the same time as serving 
the initial obligation for aviation training, for example. 
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years of service (three years for the first year of education, then one year for each 
following year of education) upon the completion of a graduate degree.11 
C.        GRADUATE EDUCATION AVAILABLE TO NAVAL OFFICERS 
Since the founding of the Naval Postgraduate School in 1909, the Navy has 
recognized a need for advanced education for its officers. At the time, new propulsion 
and weapon systems for ships highlighted the need for an officer corps with elevated 
levels of technical skills. The Navy has faced issues of developing and integrating 
emerging technologies since the introduction of the steam plant in the late 1800's. 
Today's Navy may have a different face, but the need for highly educated officers 
remains. This section will address the various means for naval officers to obtain a 
graduate education. In the promote/screen data set used in this thesis, 453 (24.9%) 
officers earned graduate degrees on their own time and 325 (17.9%) officers earned 
degrees through a full-time program. Table 3.4 below displays the breakdown by 
promotion fiscal year of officers who received various types of graduate degrees. 
Table 3.4 - Count and Percent of Graduate Education Status by Promotion Board Fiscal 
Year 
PROMOTI ON BOARD FISCAL YEAR 



















































































1.   Naval Postgraduate School 
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) is the cornerstone for advanced education 
in the Navy. The NPS also serves as the central point of review for officers desiring fully 
funded graduate education. Officers receiving a degree from the NPS do not bear any of 
the direct educational costs of their respective programs. However, officers are expected 
to pay for their own materials, and they receive a quarterly reimbursement of $125 to help 
defray the cost of textbooks. Degree programs at the NPS last anywhere from 12 months 
to 2 years and officers attend classes full time. The curriculum is primarily technical in 
nature, offering masters of science in 46 areas of study.12 Of the 46 Master of Science 
programs, 31 are considered technical programs for the purposes of this study. Examples 
of technical fields are Applied Physics, Meteorology, or Aeronautical Engineering. 
However, the NPS also offers seven programs where an officer can earn a Master's of 
Arts, primarily in the area of National Security Affairs. Along with the Master of Arts 
curricula, examples of non-technical degrees are Masters of Science in Leadership and 
Human Resource Development, Management, and Defense Analysis. The NPS 
establishes its curricula based on the needs of various Navy and Department of Defense 
(DOD) sponsors. One advantage of the NPS is that it is able to respond to the needs of 
the naval service by tailoring its programs to match current educational demands. 
12
 NPS School Catalog, Academic Year 2000. 
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2.   Civilian Institutions 
A number of fully-funded programs are available for officers to pursue full-time 
graduate education at Navy approved civilian institutions. Currently, 36 curricula are 
offered at over 65 civilian institutions in fields such as Operational Oceanography, 
Chemistry, Law, and Public Affairs.13 The NPS serves as the central point of review for 
officers applying to these programs. Officers must meet the academic standards and 
standardized testing minimums of the respective universities. Once accepted into a 
civilian university degree program, officers retain their salaries and military status, but 
are considered full time students. The Navy covers the cost of tuition and educational 
fees, with the officer obligating for additional years of service after completing the 
degree. The degree programs offered at civilian institutions are meant to provide 
education in subspecialty areas not covered by the NPS or other DOD schools. Examples 
of these degree programs are degrees in Public Affairs, International Relations and 
Diplomacy, Education and Training Management, and Nuclear Engineering.14 There are 
several other full time programs, limited to only one or two officers per year that provide 





 OPNAV NOTICE 1520, Funded Graduate Education Programs (FY-97), 21 October 1996. Enclosure 
(2). 
15
 For more information on these programs, refer to OPNAVINST 1520.23B, Graduate Education, 1 
October 1991. 
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3. Graduate Education Voucher (GEV) Program 
The Navy provides funding for some advanced degrees earned during an officer's 
off-duty time. The Graduate Education Voucher (GEV) program, formerly known as 
Tuition Assurance (TASS), provides "up to $40,000 for two years of off-duty graduate 
education for unrestricted line officers whose career paths provide limited opportunity for 
full time graduate education."16 Participation in the GEV program obligates an officer to 
remain on active duty 3 months for every month of schooling completed, to a maximum 
of 36 months. The obligation begins upon completion of, or disenrollment from, the 
degree program. In fiscal year 2001, 33 GEV program quotas are available for aviation 
officers. It is important to note that officers in this program are working in a full time 
Navy billet in addition to pursuing an advanced degree. The main requirement is that the 
degree program provide a 'Navy relevant' master's degree that fulfills the requirements 
of at least one subspecialty code. 
4. Part-Time Graduate Education 
The final way for naval officers to receive an advanced degree is to earn it on their 
own time. Officers incur all of the costs of the degree, and pursue the degree during their 
off-duty hours. In this instance, officers are free to chose their area of study and do not 
incur any additional service obligation. Officers that complete a degree in this manner 
are encouraged to notify the Bureau of Personnel of their advanced educational status. If 
the degree does not fulfill the requirements of the subspecialty system, a generic G-code 
16
 NAVADMIN 015/00, Graduate Education Voucher Program, Formerly the Tuition Assurance Program. 
DTG041955ZFEB00. 
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for 'master's degree' is entered into the officer's service record. Many officers choose 
this form of obtaining a higher education because it allows for more options when 
making decisions about a naval career versus a transition to civilian life. 
D.       SUMMARY 
The Navy offers numerous opportunities for officers to obtain advanced 
education. The problem faced by the typical aviator is fitting graduate education into an 
already busy career. The first opportunity for full-time graduate education is during the 
first shore-tour rotation, at approximately the six-year mark in an average aviation career. 
The second opportunity is after the department head tour, approximately 11 years into a 
career. Many officers choose staff or FRS billets for shore-duty and attend graduate 
school at night. The most limiting circumstance is to pursue graduate education while 
assigned to an operational, or sea-going billet. Another factor working against earning a 
degree during sea-duty is the limited spare-time available to an officer. This makes it 
more difficult to complete a degree program, but not so much as to make graduate 
education impossible. The greatest difficulty lies in communication abilities while 
underway. However, with improvements in satellite transmission/reception capabilities, 
email, and the explosion of distance learning, Navy-sponsored graduate education may 
soon be available to officers while in a deployed status. 
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IV.      DATABASE AND MODELING SPECIFICATION 
A.        DISCUSSION 
The objective of this study is to assess the effects of a fully funded graduate 
education on promotion/command screen probability for fixed-wing, carrier-based 
aviators.1 The logit model uses the joint probability of promoting to commander and 
screening for squadron command as its performance measure. Most, if not all, carrier- 
based squadrons are commanded by commanders (Pay Grade 5 officers). However, 
promoting to commander does not necessarily guarantee an officer will be selected to 
command a squadron and without a command tour it is unlikely that an officer will 
continue to ascend in rank in his or her operational specialty. The model uses various 
direct and proxy measures to account for ability, employment experience, and affective 
skills. This study is based on information from Department of the Navy administrative 
files, specifically officer data card (ODC) and performance summary report (PSR) 
information. The data set includes pre-commissioning education data as well as post- 
commissioning military experience data. 
A pooled, cross-sectional time series database encompassing all aviation officers 
in the Navy that were considered for promotion to commander during fiscal years 1981 to 
1989 was used as the basis of this study. These cohorts had the opportunity to be 
considered for promotion to captain in 1986 to 1995. The original data set consisted of 
1
 "Naval aviator" refers to both pilots and naval flight officers throughout this study, unless otherwise 
stated. 
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3,585 observations, which account for all naval aviators, without regard to platform type. 
This study restricts the data to fixed-wing, carrier-based aviators, resulting in 1,817 total 
observations. After deleting observations with missing data, the final data set consists of 
1,251 observations.2 
The data were first restricted to naval aviators, to account for screening practices 
and differences in career paths between aviation and the other unrestricted line 
communities. Using additional qualification designations (AQD's), the data are restricted 
to fixed-wing, carrier-based aviators. This group includes officers qualified in the various 
fighter, attack, combat-support jets, and combat-support propeller-driven aircraft. This 
restriction serves several purposes. First, there is a general perception among carrier- 
based aviators that one's career is better served by accepting duty involving flying, even 
during an officer's scheduled shore-duty rotation. Serving as a flight instructor or 
working at one of the many weapons schools are examples of shore duties that maintain 
aviation currency. Any billet that effectively removes an officer from flying duties (such 
as staff tours, postgraduate school, or non-flying instructor duty) is perceived to have a 
much higher opportunity cost in terms of foregoing operational experience deemed 
valuable in the promotion process. Second, carrier aviation is a select community 
involving rigorous testing and competition. The limited carrier billets available and 
competition among flight students for carrier-based platforms effectively selects only the 
2
 Missing data in the Percentage of Times Recommended for Accelerated Promotion as a Pay Grade 3 
officer (PRAP3) variable accounts for 394 cases, and missing data in the Academic Proficiency Code 
variable accounts for 295 cases. Some observations are missing information in both variables, accounting 
for the final number of 1,251 observations. This is due to incomplete data or missing data from original 
Officer Data Card fields. 
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top performers among aviation junior officers into these billets. Third, training pipelines 
for carrier-based aviators can range anywhere from one to three years longer than rotary 
wing or land-based maritime patrol aircraft. This is due to the additional requirements 
surrounding aircrew certification for carrier operations. The longer time-to-train affects 
the windows of opportunity for shore-duty billets and heavily influences the decision 
officers make when deciding the type of shore-duty billet they would prefer. In short, 
this is a rather homogenous group, with a high level of motivation, with similar career 
paths and similar amounts of time spent in training squadrons, and with only a limited 
amount of time available to pursue fully funded graduate education. 
B.        VARIABLE DISCUSSION 
Table 4.1 displays the variables hypothesized to have an effect on the probability 
of an aviator realizing the joint outcome of promote/command screen along with the 
expected signs of those variables. 
Several interaction variables are included in the model to test the hypotheses 
discussed above. These interaction variables are used to better estimate the effects of 
type of degree earned in conjunction with the timing ofthat degree. As discussed earlier, 
there are limited opportunities in an aviator's career to obtain full-time graduate 
education. Equally as important in the decision to attend full-time graduate education is 
the type of degree desired. The interaction variables allow for a direct comparison of 
these effects when compared to officers without degrees, thus providing officers 
considering graduate education better information when making the graduate education 
decision. 
53 
Table 4.1 also provides descriptive statistics for the analysis variables. Further 
analysis of the variable categories is discussed later in this chapter. For this sample, 
about 40 percent have some type of graduate degree at the Pay Grade 5 point in a career, 
but less than 2.0 percent utilize that degree. Only six percent have undergraduate grade 
point averages greater than 3.2 on a 4.0 scale. The majority of the sample (72.9 percent) 
earned between a 2.20 and 3.19 grade point average in their respective undergraduate 
majors, showing that the sample is not necessarily skewed towards high undergraduate 
academic achievement. 
The largest distribution of undergraduate majors is Humanities majors (25.7 
percent), followed by Business majors (18.5 percent). Overall, the technical 
undergraduate majors of Bio-Physical Science, Math, and Engineering only account for 
37.6 percent of the sample calling to question the emphasis on science and engineering 
backgrounds for naval aviators. 
Commissioning source variables account for varying levels of human capital with 
Naval Academy graduates assumed to possess higher levels of firm-specific capital. The 
majority of the sample are graduates of Officer Candidate School (50.8 percent) followed 
by 27.3 percent attending the Naval Academy, 18 percent from ROTC programs, and 3.9 
percent coming directly from enlisted ranks. 
One interesting statistic is that over 90 percent of officers in the sample are 
married, with over 50 percent having at least two children. Plane types are evenly 
distributed with the exception of combat support propeller driven aircraft (only 8.6 
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percent of the sample), but traditionally these squadrons have been relatively small in 
size, consisting of only four aircraft per squadron. 
Finally, 60 percent of the sample are pilots with the remaining 40 percent 
consisting of naval flight officers. Of these officers, 46.3 percent held the position of 
squadron maintenance officer and 44.9 percent held the position of squadron operations 
officer. The mean value for times recommended for accelerated promotion as a Pay 
Grade 3 officer is 45.3 percent, showing that being rated as a high performer is not just an 
automatic outcome in the Navy fitness report system. 
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FFNTAFT+ 1=Completed full-time, non-technical program 1 to 4+ yrs. after 04 board 0=AII Others 
.027 + 
TECHEARL 1=Completed full-time, technical program -6 to -2 yrs. before 04 board 0=AII Others 
.034 0 
TECHBEF 1=Completed full-time, technical program -1 to 0 yrs. before 04 board 0=AII Others 
.009 0 
TECHAFT+ 1=Completed full-time, technical program 1 to 4+ yrs. after 04 board O-AII Others 
.014 0 
PARTGRAD 1=Earned a master's degree on officer's own time; 0=AII Others 
.281 + 
NONE 1=No graduate degree. 0=Graduate degree 
.600 Ref. Cat. 
EVERUSE 1=Utilized P-Code Prior to 0-5 Board; 0=AII Others 
.016                 0 
Undergraduate 
APC1 
0=College GPA of 3.60-4.00 
1=College GPA of 3.20-3.59 
2=College GPA of 2.60-3.19 
3=College GPA of 2.20-2.59 
4=College GPA of 1.90-2.19 









BIOPHYS 1=Bio-Physical Sciences Undergraduate Major; 0=AII Others 
.141 0 
MATH 1=Math/Computer Sciences Undergraduate Major; 0=AII Others 
.070 0 
SOCSCI 1=Social Sciences Undergraduate Major; 0=AII Others 
.181 0 
HUMNEC 1=Humanities/Non-Engineerinq Undergraduate Major; 0=AII Others 
.257 + 
BUSINESS 1=Business/Economics Underqraduate Majors; 0=AII Others 
.185 + 
ENGINEER 1=Engineering Undergraduate Majors; 0=AII Others 
.165 Ref. Cat. 
Commissioning Source 
ROTC 1=Commissioning Source is NROTC; 0=AII Others 
.180 _ 
OCS 1 Commissioning Source is OCS; 0=AII Others 
.508 _ 
ENL_RES 




USNA 1 Commissioning Source is USNA; 0=AII Others 
.273 Ref. Cat. 
Marital Status 
MAR 2PLS 1=Married with Two or More Children; 0=AII Others 
.534 0 
MAR 1C 1=Married with Zero to One Children; 0=AII Others 
.329 0 
SING DIV 1=Single or Divorced; 0=Married 
.092 Ref. Cat. 
Plane Type 
ATTACK 1=Plane type is A-4, A-6, A-7; 0=AII Others 
.371 0 
CSJET 1=Plane type is EA-3, EA-6; 0=AII Others 
.225 0 
CSPROP 1=Plane type is E-2; 0=AII Others 
.086 0 
FIGHTER 1=Plane type is F-4, F-14, F/A-18; 0=AII Others 
.319 Ref. Cat. 
Job/Occupat ion 
PILOT 1=Pilot; 0=Naval Flight Officer 
.60 0 
MAINTOFF 1=Served as a Squadron Maintenance Officer; 0=AII Others 
.463 + 
OPSOFF 1=Served as a Squadron Operations Officer; 0=AII Others 
.449 + 
PRAP3 Percentage of Times Recommended for Accelerated Promotion on 








 11.9% have FFGE, 28.1% have Part-Time graduate education, and 60.0% have no graduate education. 
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C.        HYPOTHESES 
Within the Navy, proven performance in key billets is the cornerstone of the 
promotion system. The Navy uses an internal labor market, has various up-or-out stages 
within a given officer's career, and is hierarchical in its structure. This study's model 
follows Becker (1962,1975) and Wise's (1975) human capital models, which partition 
human capital into cognitive and affective skills.3 Cognitive skills are those associated 
with reasoning ability, academic and analytical skills that an individual may acquire in 
school. Affective skills are those skills that help an individual function effectively within 
a given organization. Examples of affective skills would be the ability to motivate others, 
to deal effectively with conflict, and to lead a group of people to higher levels of 
performance. Affective skills are difficult to quantify, as certain traits may prove 
effective in one organizational culture, yet be unwelcome in another. 
The prior literature indicates that as an individual accumulates more human 
capital, wages (Becker, 1975) or rate of promotion (Wise, 1975) tend to increase. For the 
Navy, pay is administratively set according to officer grade and therefore cannot be used 
to measure true productivity. A more accurate measure of officer performance is 
promotion to higher Pay Grades and ultimately screening for squadron command. 
3
 Becker (1962, 1975) used salary and age-earnings profiles, where Wise (1975) suggested that promotions 
were a more valid measure of human productivity. Both methods seek to quantify productivity, as 
measured through a combination of ability and skill. See discussion in Chapter II, Literature Review. 
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1.   Graduate Education 
The logit model uses several proxies for cognitive and affective skills (see 
discussion in Chapter II) in order to characterize levels of human capital for a given set of 
officers and to evaluate their effects on the probability of promoting to commander (Pay 
Grade 5) and screening for squadron command. The literature review suggests that 
graduate education should have a positive effect on individual performance outcomes 
(Becker, 1975; Wise, 1975). For the model specified in this study, four dimensions of 
graduate education are examined: (1) undertaking a full-time versus part-time program; 
(2) technical specificity of the program; (3) timing of graduate education during one's 
career; and (4) utilization of graduate education in a later sub-specialty billet. 
Officers selecting part-time graduate education fit a degree program in on their 
own time and do not realize the associated opportunity costs of non-observed fitness 
reports or time away from operational flying. Therefore, the first hypothesis of this thesis 
is that the acquisition of part-time graduate education should have a positive effect on 
promote/screen because the human capital augmentation will exceed the opportunity cost 
of the time spent completing the degree. As such, the sign for the part-time graduate 
education variable should be positive. Hypothesis testing for fully-funded graduate 
education is more complicated and this thesis seeks to test the effects of timing combined 
with technical specificity of a degree using several interaction variables. These 
hypotheses are discussed below, followed by a more in depth discussion of model 
variables and of the hypothesized signs and significance of secondary control variables. 
58 
There is an opportunity cost in obtaining fully-funded graduate education (FFGE). 
The officer realizes this cost in the form of at least two years of unobserved (non- 
competitive) fitness reports. Additionally, there is a cost in foregone billets at various 
points in a career. For example, an officer selecting FFGE two to six years prior to the 
Pay Grade 4 board is competing against officers who may be instructors at the FRS, 
TRACOM, or weapons schools (see Career Progression Chart, Ch. III). Officers not 
selecting FFGE are earning competitive fitness reports and continuing to maintain their 
flight proficiency, as well as enhancing their reputation within the aviation community. 
Therefore, the second hypothesis is that officers obtaining graduate education early 
(defined as two to six years prior to the Pay Grade 4 board) in a career would realize a net 
negative effect of FFGE as the opportunity costs are projected to exceed the positive 
human capital investment effect from enhanced productivity. 
However, officers selecting FFGE no earlier than two years prior to the Pay Grade 
4 board would have had time to establish a solid performance record in at least two 
competitive tours (the first operational fleet assignment and a follow-on tour as a flight 
instructor, for example) making the net effect of FFGE received just before the Pay Grade 
4 board positive. The same holds true for those who select FFGE just after the Pay Grade 
4 board. Officers usually screen for 0-4 at the ten-year point in a career and have four 
years to complete a 2 1/2 year department head tour before becoming eligible for review 
at the Pay Grade 5 board. During this time, officers are junior in Pay Grade 4 and have 
an ample amount of time to fill positions outside of aviation with lower opportunity costs 
in fitness reports foregone, since they have had ten years of service to establish a 
59 
competitive record of achievement. In summary, the timing hypotheses are that selecting 
FFGE early in one's career will have a net negative effect and selecting FFGE no earlier 
than two years before the Pay Grade 4 board (defined as BEF and AFT+ in Table 4.1) 
will have a net positive effect on the promote/screen outcome. 
A third hypothesis tested in this thesis evaluates the effect of technical specificity 
of a fully-funded degree. Aviation is a technical occupation, and in the early stages of an 
officer's career the emphasis is on mastering the complex systems of combat aircraft. It 
is not until the first sea tour that aviators begin to exercise superior-subordinate 
leadership skills. Even though the role of division officer requires the affective skills of a 
leader, a large portion of a junior officer's time in the first fleet tour is spent mastering the 
complex tactics and war-fighting skills required for carrier operations. It is not until later 
in one's career, namely the department head tour, that affective skills begin to assume an 
important role in the aviator's career development. The measurement point in this 
analysis takes place at the Pay Grade 5/Command Screen boards, a point at which 
officers are expected to exercise affective skills in the performance of their duties. For 
this reason, it is hypothesized that acquiring a graduate degree in a non-technical major 
(earned just prior to or just after the Pay Grade 4 board) would increase the officer's 
affective skills, which would benefit the officer during the department head tour and have 
a net positive effect on the promote/screen outcome. Technical skills are still required 
and will continue to play a large part in an officer's career; however, the gain in technical 
expertise is not as relevant as the organizational/affective skills required at higher pay 
grades. The hypothesis is that officers with technical degrees (holding timing constant) 
60 
will have a positive effect on the promotion/screen outcome, but the effect is less than for 
non-technical degrees. 
The final hypothesis tested in this study is that utilizing a learned skill from a 
graduate degree program in an assigned sub-specialty billet should raise the level of job 
performance, and thus have a positive effect on the promotion/screen outcome. This 
would be offset, however, by the associated opportunity costs of serving in a non- 
operational billet. The variable EVERUSE indicates if a P-Coded officer served in a 
utilization tour prior to the Pay Grade 5 promotion board. Given the two opposing forces 
described herein, it difficult to assess the sign or significance of EVERUSE. Serving a 
"pay-back" tour should be beneficial to one's career progression, but the associated 
opportunity costs of serving in a non-operational billet may offset the initial positive 
effect. As such the hypothesized sign on the variable EVERUSE should not differ 
significantly from zero. 
2.   Other Causal Factors and Hypotheses 
The following variables discussed in the chapter are specified in the 
promotion/screen model for the purpose of controlling for other factors that are expected 
to be related to the dependent variable. These include variables typically specified in 
human capital models, such as undergraduate education, type of college major, marital 
status, and accession source. In addition, other variables are included as proxies for what 
is typically termed one's motivation, desire, and perseverance. The explicitly specified 
variables in this model include self-selection into the various plane types, early career 
performance, and selection to key positions after close observation of personal 
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performance traits. Finally, fiscal year dummies are specified to account for promotion 
and command screen directives that may differ over this nine-year period (1986-1995). 
a.   Undergraduate Education 
College grade point average (APC1) and undergraduate majors 
(BIOPHYS, MATH, SOCSCI, HUMNEC, BUSINESS, and ENGINEER) are included as 
measures of cognitive ability and pre-commissioning academic performance. APC1 is a 
nominal variable, coded from '0' to '5' with '0' representing a cumulative grade point 
average between 3.6 and 4.0 on a 4-point scale. Note that APC1 is an inverted scale in 
that as grades improve, the integer is decreasing. In accordance with theory (Becker, 
1961) higher undergraduate grades should have a positive effect on promote/screen, and 
thus one would expect a "negative" sign on this inverted variable. 
The point in an officer's career that the performance outcome of 
command/screen occurs affects the signs of the undergraduate major variables. The early 
stages of an aviation career require a baseline of technical competence; however, as the 
career progresses to the department head stage affective skills take on increasing levels of 
importance. Certain majors provide an emphasis in management/leadership techniques, 
and insights into human behavior that would benefit officers as a department head and 
beyond. Specifically, business majors may provide an appropriate mix of 
technical/mathematical education (which is beneficial early in a career) and the 
management skills necessary later in a career. Social Science and Humanities majors 
may have insights into human behavior that may be extremely helpful in leadership 
positions and make them better suited to advanced management positions in a firm. 
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Engineering, Math/Computer Science, and the Biological-Physical Sciences focus on the 
mechanical application of processes, providing little, if any, education on 
management/leadership. As such it is hypothesized that BUSINESS, SOCSCI, 
HUMNEC coefficients will be positive when compared to ENGINEERS (the reference 
category). Coefficients for MATH and BIOPHYS will not differ significantly from zero. 
b.   Commissioning Source and Marital Status 
The model also includes various demographic variables to control for 
differences in individual backgrounds between officers. Commissioning source variables 
control for differing levels of firm-specific training prior to commission (Bowman, 1990). 
Naval Academy graduates are expected to have higher initial levels of firm-specific 
capital due to intensive indoctrination and professional training as compared to other 
commissioning sources. Each commissioning source varies in length and intensity of 
training. The ROTC program lasts anywhere from 2 to 4 years, with professional courses 
taken in addition to normal college classes, however, it lacks the intensive training of the 
Naval Academy. OCS is an intensive 16-week indoctrination program, but the relatively 
rapid presentation of professional courses does not allow for much more than a 
fundamental knowledge of officership. Officers who were prior enlisted (ENL_RES) 
could be a graduate of any of the three previously discussed programs. While having 
prior fleet experience may offer some advantage in the form of perspective, and actual 
work experience, it is possible that the type of officer who decided to enlist out of high 
school rather than immediately continue their education may have lower levels of innate 
ability as evidenced by a rational decision to delay the college experience. For these 
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reasons, it is difficult to hypothesize the sign of this variable, however officership is 
intrinsically different from being an enlisted person and therefore coefficient for 
ENL_RES is expected to be slightly negative. In summary, the coefficients for ROTC, 
OCS, and ENL_RES are expected to be negative (compared to USNA). 
The variables MAR0_1C, MAR_2C, and SING_DIV control for family 
background. Theory states that being married should have a positive effect on 
productivity outcomes (Becker, 1961); however, the Stressors of military life on a family 
and the competition between the workplace and the home are expected to nullify the 
positive effect and to not differ significantly from zero. 
The final sets of variables included in the model are added to control 
directly for a potential selection-bias that may characterize graduate school enrollment. 
Officers who enroll in graduate school are not assigned on a random basis (see Chapter 
III). Rather they first have to possess the motivation and drive to complete a graduate 
degree program, and secondly their prior academic and military performance must be 
sufficiently strong to warrant selection by the Navy. This is especially true for fully- 
funded resident programs at NPS and selected civilian institutions. From a statistical 
perspective, this non-random selection process can introduce an upwards bias to the 
estimated impacts of graduate education because part of the reason why those with a 
graduate degree may be more likely to promote/screen is due to their inherent greater 
stock of human capital and/or their being endowed with greater innate ability. If one does 
not somehow "control" for this fact, then the estimated impact of graduate education will 
be biased upwards as it includes the direct effect of enhanced productivity from acquiring 
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a graduate degree plus the indirect effect of being associated with individuals who, prior 
to obtaining a graduate degree, were more likely to promote/screen in the first place. 
A common approach not followed in this model is to specify a two-stage 
regression model to control for self-selection bias, as is done with the "Heckman 
Correction" methodology.4 In this approach, a selection model is first estimated and the 
error-term from this model is next used as an additional explanatory variable in the main 
outcomes equation. This approach is often used when a researcher lacks information 
about individual motivation, desire, perseverance and behavior. However in this unique 
database, it is assumed that the researcher can rely explicitly on profiles for these factors 
and as such, one can specify a simple single-stage model of the individual 
promotion/screen outcome. 
c.   Plane Type 
As discussed in Chapter II, and Chapter III issues of self-selection exist 
within not only between warfare communities, but also within the aviation warfare 
community. As a generality, better performers select into the fighter and attack 
communities. The four community categories, ATTACK, CSJET, CSPROP, and 
FIGHTER also control for differing degrees of selection and variation in command 
opportunity among the platforms. At the commander promotion/command screen boards, 
officers have made a rational decision to stay in the Navy and the Navy has allowed them 
to continue to at least the Pay Grade 4 point because of an above average level of 
4
 See for example: James Heckman, Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error. Econometrica, v.47, 
Issue 1, pp. 153-162, January, 1979.) 
65 
performance. As such, abilities and performance are less affected by plane type than by 
individual selections. This variable is a proxy not only for initial self-selection, but also 
accounts for differences in command opportunity that may exist among the various plane 
types.   The fighter community is traditionally viewed as the most select group among 
carrier aviators, however, due to the point of measurement, it is hypothesized that none of 
the communities (ATTACK, CSJET, or CSPROP) will differ significantly from zero. 
d.   Job/Occupation 
As explained earlier, the variable PILOT controls for any differences in 
human capital and possible differences in selection behavior between pilots and naval 
flight officers. While, pilots are hypothesized to be a more select group, naval flight 
officers are hypothesized to have more firm-specific capital, as their aviation skills do not 
directly translate to civil aviation (see Chapter III). Since these two factors work in 
opposite directions, the coefficient on PILOT is hypothesized not to differ significantly 
from zero. 
To better assess the affective skills and account for the unobserved 
qualities in officers, variables for two key billets in a carrier-based squadron are used. 
The first is MATNTOFF, denoting an officer who filled the position of squadron 
maintenance officer. The second is OPSOFF, denoting an officer who served as a 
squadron operations officer.5 It is important to understand the significance of these 
positions, and why they are hypothesized to be valid measures of both affective skills, 
Michael Orzell (1998) used these variables as indicators of 'good jobs.' 
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such as motivation, drive, and perseverance; and performance in Pay Grade 4. These two 
positions are normally held by a Pay Grade 4 officer who has been assigned to a 
particular squadron for at least VA to 2V2 years. Unlike other URL communities, aviation 
officers are sent to a 'generic' department head tour. 
The various positions they will hold in a squadron are determined by the 
squadron's commanding officer, not the community detailer. As such, only the top 
performers, based on direct observation in that particular squadron, are assigned to these 
positions. This assignment process accounts for the difficulties in assessing levels of 
human capital through quantifiable data (which is all the community detailers have 
available to them). These variables are included to attempt to capture the non- 
quantifiable effects of individual motivation, ability, initiative, decision-making, and 
imaginative thinking, since being selected for these positions reveals a commanding 
officer's true evaluation of these qualities. It is expected that these variables will be 
highly significant and positive. 
Finally, performance as Pay Grade 3 officer (PRAP3) is included to 
control for observed differences in early career performance. Performance in a 
competitive billet is the basis for promotion in the Navy (Chapter III) and including 
PRAP3 in the model is a control for any potential selection bias that may arise due to 
these differences. The variable PRAP3 is hypothesized to have a large, positive effect on 
the promote/screen outcome. 
All models incorporate fiscal year dummies to account for changes in the 
fiscal environment such as promotion rates and command opportunity, which may vary 
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annually. Significant downsizing occurred at numerous point throughout the nine year 
time frame of this analysis, and may introduce a negative effect on the promote/screen 
outcome in the affected years. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This study will use non-linear, maximum likelihood estimation techniques to 
evaluate the effects of the independent variables on the promotion/command screen 
outcome. Since the dependent variable in this case is dichotomous (l=promote/screen, 
0=did not promote/screen), we will use a logit model to determine the probability of the 
outcome occurring, given some value for the independent variables. The estimation 
technique maximizes the likelihood that the X| Y population is best represented by the 
observed sample of X|Y pairs. The benefit of this estimation method is that tests for 
statistical significance (e.g., t-values) are statistically reliable. (Bowman, 1998). 
E. SUMMARY 
The model specified to measure the effects of a fully-funded graduate education 
include variables to control for differences in human capital between individuals and self- 
selection processes as well. The purpose is to arrive at the most unbiased estimator for 
the effects of fully-funded graduate education on promotion/command screen. The model 
controls for observable characteristics, such as undergraduate grades, major, and other 
variables discussed earlier. An important aspect of this model is its indirect measurement 
of the unobservable characteristics, such as motivation, desire, and perseverance, through 
use of the Maintenance and Operation's officer and Pay Grade 3 performance (PRAP3) 
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variables. It should be noted that the graduate education coefficients are typically subject 
to self-selection bias and without the previously discussed controls in the model the 
impacts of graduate education coefficients would be biased upwards. Ultimately, the 
model seeks to quantify the increase in productivity as measured by promotion/command 
screen by controlling for the possibility that officers entering a fully-funded program may 
be inherently more productive prior to entering FFGE and the act of acquiring additional 
stores of human capital must be distinguished from the fact that more able and highly 
motivated individuals are selected for funded graduate education programs in the Navy. 
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V.        EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
This chapter will discuss the empirical findings of this thesis. Previous discussion 
has described an aviator's career path as a finite and definable progression from initial 
flight training through eventual screening and selection for promotion to 
commander/screening for squadron command. This process occurs over an extended 
period of time, where the individual officer is faced with various up-or-out 
decision/screen points. It is precisely due to this increasingly competitive and constantly 
narrowing field of competitors that each duty assignment carries both a perceived cost 
and benefit for the individual officer and for the Navy. The cost of a graduate program 
includes the direct education costs of books and tuition, and more importantly the 
opportunity cost of an officer's time in the program. For off-duty programs this cost is 
merely the leisure time after work forgone. But for fully-funded programs it includes the 
time spent away from one's operational specialty. This is time otherwise spent in a 
competitive or observed billet while continuing to build one's professional reputation as 
an aviator, and is expected to change over one's career progression. 
The perceived benefits of graduate education is based upon human capital theory, 
which asserts that education enhances both general and firm-specific skills and thereby 
increasing an officer's marginal productivity. 
We assume both off-duty and full-time graduate programs increase an officer's 
general education skills, whereas only the fully-funded programs enhance Navy-specific 
skills that may be applied to "P-Coded" billets in follow-on utilization tours. The 
problem faced by officers choosing graduate education, however, is that perceived costs 
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may be higher than perceived benefits in terms of promotion/screen, and to further 
complicate the question, the opportunity costs may vary depending on when in a career 
an officer undertakes graduate education. To better estimate the unique impact of 
graduate education on the promote/screen outcome at the commander promotion point, 
one should control for individual characteristics associated with innate ability and 
motivation as well as the type and timing of the obtaining a graduate degree. 
The findings of this thesis would be generally applicable to hierarchical 
organizations that seek to quantify whether cognitive skill development at a post-graduate 
level enhances future career development. The unique approach of this thesis is that we 
account for the fact that opportunity costs may vary significantly depending on when 
advanced education is undertaken. 
The first section discusses the impacts of fully-funded graduate education and 
technical specificity of a full-time degree. The second section addresses graduate 
education models with the addition of timing of the degree in relation to the Pay Grade 4 
board. Timing is included to account for variation in opportunity costs versus human 
capital accumulation at various stages of an aviator's career. Once timing of a degree is 
controlled for, we begin to see significant and positive impacts for various types of 
graduate degrees. The final logit model incorporates controls for individual 
characteristics, which separate the impact of the graduate degree from the type of officer 
who may acquire a degree, providing the best impacts of graduate education on the 
promote/screen outcome. The analysis concludes with notional person analysis to more 
clearly illustrate the logit regression estimates. 
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A.        LOGIT MODELING: TYPE OF GRADUATE EDUCATION 
The first modeling specification considers full-time graduate education grouped 
by technical specificity of the degree. Technical specificity of a degree is considered 
because different kinds of human capital may be acquired depending on the degree 
program. Comparison of technical and non-technical programs is also done to 
Figure 5.1 
Observed Promote/Screen Rate by Graduate Degree 
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emphasize the Navy's continuous demand for officers with technical backgrounds. 
Figure 5.1 displays the mean values of promote/screen for Pay Grade 4 officers grouped 
by the technical specificity of a full-time degree. The promote/screen rates for full-time 
technical (FFTECH) and full-time non-technical (FFNTECH) promote/screen rates do 
not differ significantly from the aggregate mean promote/screen rate, which is 38.8 
percent.6 Only the mean rate for part-time graduate education shows any significance 
6
 Associated t-tests are included in Appendix D. 
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(2<0.05), with a promote/screen rate of 44%, which is 5.2 percentage points above the 
mean rate of promote/screen. 
A logit model (Table 5.1) considering the technical specificity of a full-time 
degree is estimated to test the effects of technical specificity on the dependent variable, 
Table 5.1 - Model #1, Dependent Variable = Promote/Screen3, b (n=l,251) 
Coefficient       (S.E.) 
Constant                                       -.684 
Technical Full-Time:                      .118 (-242) 
Non-Technical Full-Time               -.211 (-242) 
Part-Timec .282** (,UQ) 
b. 
a
     Model incorporates fiscal year dummies with FY84 as the omitted category. 
Statistical significance indicated as follows: *=0.10, **=0.05, ***=0.01. 
No Graduate Degree is omitted category. 
promote/screen. This initial specification shows the impacts of graduate education 
independent of any human capital or self-selection controls. This first modeling 
specification is an estimate of the impacts of graduate status on promote/screen outcomes 
and does not attempt to separate the impact of acquiring a degree from the types of 
officers who choose to complete and who are selected to attend a graduate degree 
program. 
Table 5.1 illustrates that the full-time graduate education coefficients for both 
technical and non-technical degrees are insignificant, showing that no premium is 
realized by aviators undertaking full-time graduate education. However, it is also 
important to note that these officers are not at a disadvantage when compared to officers 
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without degrees, as they enjoy approximately the same probability of promote/screen as 
officers without degrees (the omitted category). 
In this model, full-time technical and non-technical degrees carry the benefit of 
both firm-specific and general human capital accumulation, where part-time graduate 
education is purely general human capital, since a sub-specialty code and possible future 
utilization are tied to the first two categories. However, the critical difference between 
full-time and part-time education is the net costs of each program. It is possible that the 
net costs for fully-funded programs in terms of billets foregone is so high, that it offsets 
the additional benefits that should be realized through an associated increase in both firm- 
specific and general human capital. Conversely, the opportunity cost of part-time 
graduate education is relatively low, setting a lower threshold in terms of personal and 
professional benefit. This could explain the resilience of part-time graduate education 
throughout the various model specifications. 
Table 5.1 shows that it makes little difference whether an officer chooses a 
technical or non-technical degree program for full-time graduate education. However, 
officers who complete graduate education on their own time realize a positive premium 
on the promote/screen outcome. This preliminary model suggests that full-time graduate 
education does not enhance or reduce one's chances for promotion to commander/screen 
for squadron command. But prior discussion and literature suggest that other factors 
must be considered in context with graduate education. Throughout an officer's career, 
the effects of motivation, ability, management of personal affairs, occupation and 
performance are either directly considered or have an indirect effect on performance and 
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ultimate selection for promotion/command screen. The next section considers the effects 
of timing of a degree, in addition to technical specificity. As will be shown, once we 
consider the timing of a degree, the individual officer begins to realize positive effects for 
various types of full-time graduate education. 
B.        LOGIT MODELING: TYPE AND TIMING OF GRADUATE EDUCATION 
Observed Outcomes. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the effects of 
graduate education on the probability of promoting to Pay Grade 5/screening for 
squadron command. This section takes the previous analysis one step further and 
incorporates interaction variables to account for the acquisition, timing, and technical 
specificity of fully funded graduate education. As discussed previously, opportunity 
costs for aviators are not fixed. The opportunity costs vary depending on when graduate 
education is undertaken. Included variables accounting for timing of a degree are critical, 
as model estimates will show we start to see significant, positive impacts of fully-funded, 
full-time graduate education. The section begins with a discussion on the observed 
differences between graduate education variables and describes the logit model used in 
the analysis. 
Figure 5.2 displays promote screen rate by type of graduate degree. The mean 
rate of promotion/screen for officers without graduate education (NONE) is 38.1 percent. 
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Figure 5.2 
Unadjusted Promote/Screen Rate by Graduate Degree 
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Note* Aggregate Mean Rate of Promote/Screen is 38.8%. 
a
 Once timing of education is included in the model, 39 of 95 officers getting full-time technical degrees 
are omitted. This is from missing data on year when degree was awarded in this particular category. 
At first glance, it appears that most graduate education, regardless of timing, type, or 
technical specificity has a positive effect on promote/screen compared to officers without 
graduate education (NONE). The one exception is for those officers who earn a master's 
degree in a non-technical field six to two years before the Pay Grade 4 board (FFNT 
EARLY), who promote/screen at a rate of only 29.6 percent. However, in this table the 
effects of other factors, such as affective skill, performance, and differing backgrounds 
that may influence the promote/screen outcome, have not been accounted for. 
77 
Given the observed outcomes, a logit model is specified to test the impacts of 
timing of a degree on the promote/screen outcome, independent of controls for 
differences in cognitive skills, innate ability, and selection involved in the graduate 
education analysis. Table 5.2 shows the impacts of each graduate education category 
with respect to timing of a degree. Part-time education remains independent of the timing 
question, yet still must be considered in order to control for people with similar trends in 
human capital accumulation.7 
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After 04 Board       1.621***      (0.587) 
Utilize Degree -0.605*       (0.343) 
a
      Model incorporates fiscal year dummies with FY84 as the omitted category. 
b
     Statistical significance indicated as follows: *=0.10, **=0.05, ***=0.01. 
c
     No Graduate Degree is omitted category. 
Table 5.2 shows that once the varying opportunity costs are controlled, in terms of 
when graduate education is acquired, the impacts of graduate education often become 
Since no time in one's community is foregone when undertaking part-time programs, it is not necessary 
to control for the year in which a degree is earned off-duty. 
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positive and significant.  Full-time technical graduate education, earned just after the Pay 
Grade 4 board, shows the largest significant and positive impact for graduate education. 
A technical degree earned 2 to 6 years prior to the Pay Grade 4 board is positive and 
significant as well, but the impact is half that of a technical degree earned later in a 
career. The only non-technical degree with any significant impact is one earned just prior 
to the Pay Grade 4 board. However, "non-technical before" degree holders have 
approximately the same probability of promote/screen as officers earning technical 
degrees later in a career. Part-time graduate education maintains a positive and 
significant impact on promote/screen even with controls for timing of full-time education 
included in the model. It is interesting to note that the impacts of the three significant 
full-time degrees are 2 to 4 Vi times that of part-time graduate education, showing a larger 
net benefit for several full-time programs when one controls for varying opportunity 
costs. Once again, it is possible that the benefit from part-time graduate education is 
relatively small in terms of accumulation of firm-specific human capital, but the 
associated opportunity costs of competitive billets foregone is small or even non-existent. 
It does appear that utilization of a degree has a negative impact on the promote/screen 
process. But much like the above discussed graduate education coefficients, it is difficult 
to draw conclusions without controlling for differences between individual officers in the 
sample. 
Timing of a degree is crucial because opportunity cost varies by time in an 
officer's career; however, we must also recognize that net benefits to acquiring a graduate 
degree may across types of officer, who screen/select into the various graduate education 
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programs. Once we control for differences across individuals, with varying levels of 
cognitive and innate abilities, we expect to derive better estimated impacts of graduate 
education programs on officer promotion/screen outcomes. 
C.       FINAL LOGIT MODEL RESULTS 
Previous discussion and model specifications show that timing and technical 
specificity of a graduate degree have a significant impact on the promote/screen outcome. 
However, neither Model One nor Model Two attempted to control for individual 
characteristics that may have an effect on both the decision to earn an advanced degree 
and on the promote/screen outcome. Such characteristics include differences in innate 
ability, motivation, and in selection practices between various aviation communities. The 
primary purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the impact of full-time graduate education on 
promoting to commander/screening for squadron command. Controlling for factors 
involved in the graduate education decision/selection allows us to derive a more accurate 
and less biased impacts of full-time graduate education, on career progression. 
The final elements in the fully specified model for graduate education below are 
controls for self-selection. By controlling for differences in both cognitive and affective 
skills, this model specification adjusts for self-selection bias and yields the best estimates 
of the true impacts of the various graduate education programs examined in this study. 
There are two separate dimensions to the discussion in this section. The first 
explains the impacts of graduate education versus other factors related to the 
promote/screen outcome. Additionally, it offers an explanation of the impacts of these 
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other factors, which include both observed characteristics and proxies for unobserved 
motivation and dedication which are factored into the model to control for self-selection 
bias. Part two below discusses graduate education with distinctions made between fully- 
funded technical, fully-funded non-technical, and part-time graduate education and the 
importance that timing plays in the final modeling specification. Additionally, controls 
for self-selection bias will be discussed throughout. 
Based on economic theory and evaluation of the data, the final logit model is 
specified to better estimate the impacts of various restrictions placed on the model. Table 
5.3 summarizes the results of the final statistical model and includes Model Two (from 
Table 5.2) for comparison. Covariates with a high degree of statistical significance are 
designated with asterisks. (All models incorporate fiscal year dummies, with FY84 as the 
omitted category, to account for differences in board directives, fiscal environments, and 
the like.) The final model (Model Three) builds on the previous one to better estimate the 
true effects of graduate education on the probability of promote/screen. 
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Table 5.3 - Dependent Variable = Promote/Screen' a, b, c 
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-2 Log Likelihood 1517.651 1304.256 
All models incorporate fiscal year dummies with FY84 as the 
Statistical significance indicated as follows: *=0.10, **=0.05, 
Engineering major is the omitted category. 
USNA is the omitted category. 
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Model Two in Table 5.3 (which duplicates Table 5.2 above) evaluates the impact 
of graduate education variables on the promote/screen outcome without controlling for 
individual differences in officers including possible self-selection bias and was discussed 
in detail in the previous section. Model Three incorporates human capital variables such 
as undergraduate grades and major, commissioning source, and marital status. 
Additionally, the final model (Model Three) controls for factors related to individual 
motivation, drive, and desire to address issues of self-selection bias. This third and final 
model takes into account pre- and post-commissioning factors hypothesized to have an 
effect on an officer's career path. The extent of adjustments included in Model Three is 
comparatively large. Previous literature has considered the technical specificity of a 
degree, human capital variables, and controls for ability and motivation (Bowman & 
Mehay, 1999; Orzell, 1998; Buterbaugh, 1995). However, this thesis takes the prior 
literature a step further and incorporates the timing of a degree, as well as community 
specific controls to account for different levels of motivation, training, and command 
opportunity among the various aircraft types. 
It is important to realize that Model Two in Table 5.2/Table 5.3 is subject to an 
upwards bias on the estimated impacts of graduate education due to the self-selection 
process explained above and in Chapter IV. Model Three explicitly controls for self- 
selection bias, as well as human capital factors, presenting the best estimators of the 
impacts of graduate education on promote/screen. 
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1.   Discussion of Control Variables 
In the final model specification (Model Three, Table 5.3), various control 
variables are included to account for differences in individual behaviors and factors that 
may influence a given career. This section discusses five factors other than graduate 
education that have an effect on the joint outcome of promoting to commander/screening 
for squadron command: 1) undergraduate performance, 2) commissioning source, 3) 
marital status, 4) plane type, and 5) jobs/early career performance. A discussion of 
graduate education estimates follows in the next section. 
a.   Undergraduate Academic Performance Covariates 
As seen in Table 5.3, undergraduate grades are significant and have a 
positive effect on the promote/screen outcome. To the extent college grades act as a 
proxy for innate abilities, those officers with better grades are more likely to 
promote/screen. A humanities major is the only significant undergraduate major in the 
final model, having a negative effect on the promotion/screen outcome. It is 
hypothesized that being a humanities major would have a positive impact on 
promote/screen, due to insights into human behavior gained through a liberal education. 
It was expected that officers at the department head level (the point of measurement for 
this study) would realize a gain from any non-technical education, due to the increased 
requirements for management/leadership skills at higher levels of the organization.   The 
negative impact of the humanities major covariate is possibly indicative of the high level 
of technical expertise expected in an officer's career. Bivariate correlations (shown in 
Appendix A) show humanities majors to have higher early career performance scores 
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than engineers (the comparison category). It is possible that these officers may possess 
greater initial affective skills but lower cognitive and technical skills early in a career. A 
large portion of an aviation junior officer's job is mastering the complex systems and 
procedures involved in operating modem aircraft. Those officers without any technical 
training are at an initial disadvantage, especially in flight school and the FRS. The 
management or "people" skills these officers may possess do not become evident until 
later in their first or even second sea tours, when they are assigned as division officers or 
department heads. It is precisely at this point that the humanities, social science, and 
other non-technical majors should realize a premium over those officers with hard math, 
science, and engineering backgrounds. It should be noted that even though there is an 
increase in the relevance of affective skills, technical skills are still highly relevant as 
long as an officer is involved in the operation of combat aircraft. Surprisingly, being a 
business major, though positive, does not differ significantly from zero in the final 
specification. The hypothesis was that business majors would show a positive and 
significant impact, as this degree usually emphasizes management education in addition 
to mathematical/technical courses. 
b.   Commissioning Source 
Naval Academy graduates (the comparison category) do not hold any 
statistically significant advantage over ROTC and OCS graduates. The initial hypothesis 
was that Naval Academy graduates would enjoy a premium over all other commission 
sources due to higher levels of firm specific capital. However, officers who are prior- 
enlisted are less likely to promote/screen when compared to Naval Academy graduates. 
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This negative effect could be due to these officers having lower levels of human capital. 
As displayed in Appendix B, the estimates for prior-enlisted officers fall by 29.8% when 
the early career performance is added to the final model, suggesting that part of this effect 
is due to lower early career performance scores of prior enlisted officers. 
c.   Marital Status 
Recent discussion concerning quality of life issues has highlighted the role 
that family plays in a service member's career. On the surface it seems that the pace of 
military operations and the ambiguities or uncertainty that are a normal part of a military 
career would be incompatible with having a family. Human capital theory states that 
being married should have a positive effect on job performance; however, the strain that a 
military career places on a marriage suggested that military service would nullify this 
effect. However, both categories of married officers with either a spouse or children are 
significant and positive when compared to officers who are single or divorced. It is 
possible that officers with families have some degree of stability or support at home that 
helps them adjust and/or perform better in the military environment (Becker, 1975). 
Officers who are single/divorced may be more likely to leave active duty due to perceived 
higher opportunities in the civilian sector. Conversely, it is possible that extra 
compensation for having dependents is a small retention factor for naval officers when 
one considers that pay or compensation in a civilian firm does not usually consider 
whether an employee is married or has dependent children. 
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d.   Plane Type 
Variables for the various plane types are included in the final model for 
several reasons. First, they account for potential issues of self-selection bias at the 
beginning of a career. They also account for potential differences in command 
opportunity among the various plane types. For example, a typical carrier air wing has 
two fighter (F-14) squadrons, two fighter/attack (F/A-18) squadrons, and one each of 
electronic attack (EA-6B), anti-submarine warfare (S-3), and early warning squadrons (E- 
2C). This means that the command opportunity is almost double for the fighter and 
fighter/attack communities, holding all other factors constant. For the time period of this 
study, the medium attack community (A-6E) was still in service, and accounted for two 
squadrons per air wing until around 1989, when air wings deployed with a single, but 
larger A-6E squadron. The coefficient for the A-6E community (ATTACK) is significant 
and positive when compared to the fighter community (the omitted category). 
Preliminary statistical models8 show that the Attack coefficient effectively doubles in size 
when PRAP3 is added to the model. In essence, attack aviators were less likely to be 
recommended for accelerated promotion than aviators in the fighter community. 
Nonetheless, there is still a positive effect of being a member of the attack community in 
the final specification. One possible explanation was a steady increase in command 
opportunity prior to the decision to retire the A-6E in 1993. 
See Appendix B. 
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e.   Jobs and Early Career Performance 
Performance in key billets is considered a prerequisite to promotion and 
command screen. Chapter IV describes the two key-billet variables in detail. As 
hypothesized in Chapter IV, both the maintenance officer and operations officer variables 
are significant and positive. The addition of early career performance to Model Three 
shows a slight increase in the positive effect that holding a good job has on 
promote/screen because without accounting for prior performance, the estimates of these 
covariates are biased downwards.9 Including early career performance in the final 
specification gives better estimates for these coefficients because of the indirect positive 
effect of performance on promotion/screen through selection to key positions.   This is 
evidence of the effect of commanding officers screening their top performing department 
heads into the two positions essential to running a squadron efficiently and effectively. 
These are the qualities considered when the promotion and command screen boards select 
the "best qualified officers" for advancement. 
There is a general perception that the less prestigious occupation of naval 
flight officer places this group at a disadvantage for promotion/screen when compared to 
pilots. This is not supported by the data, as the coefficient does not differ significantly 
from zero. 
The last control variable to discuss is early career performance. This 
variable measures the percentage of times recommended for accelerated promotion in Pay 
Grade 3. To be considered a valid recommendation, the fitness report has to be 
'Ibid. 
competitive, where an officer is rated during a regular reporting period or the detachment 
of the reporting senior. Fitness reports where an officer is ranked number 1 of 1, 
detaching fitness reports, and fitness reports received while in a training or schooling 
status are not considered valid. This covariate is highly significant and positive and has a 
noticeable effect on all other controls in the model as discussed above. The significant, 
positive effect of this variable reinforces the Navy's position that top performance in a 
competitive billet is the primary metric for officer advancement. 
2.   Discussion of Graduate Education Covariates 
This section explains the impacts of graduate education by first discussing the 
impacts of graduate education, independent of controls for self-selection bias (Model 
One, Table 5.2). Secondly, graduate education effects are evaluated once we control for 
observable characteristics and issues of self-selection bias inherent in the promote/screen 
process (see Chapter III and Chapter IV.) This section will discuss graduate education 
with distinctions explained between fully funded non-technical, fully funded technical, 
utilization of a degree, and part-time graduate education and the importance that timing 
plays in the final modeling specification. Controls for self-selection bias will be 
discussed throughout. 
a.   Fully-Funded Graduate Education 
Model Two in Table 5.3 evaluates the effects of graduate education on 
promotion/command screen free of any controls for other aspects of an officer's career. 
The covariates are interaction variables that account for both the timing and technical 
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specificity of a fully-funded graduate degree. As discussed above and in Chapter III, 
timing is a large factor in an officer's career. The decision to attend full time graduate 
education depends on an officer's future promotability and what the window of 
opportunity may be to attend a full time program. Remember that timing is a measure of 
the opportunity cost of acquiring a degree. This cost varies throughout a career. Where 
officers earn a degree early in a career, the opportunity cost may be higher, since the 
majority of their peers are primarily in competitive flight billets. The cost would be 
negligible before the Pay Grade 4 board, as this is the normal time to rotate to a shore- 
duty billet. At this point the technical specificity may be the deciding factor for realizing 
a gain or a loss from graduate education and it was hypothesized that officers earning 
non-technical degrees would be able to more directly apply the affective skills learned in 
a non-technical curriculum as future department heads. Earning the degree after the Pay 
Grade 4 board may have very little opportunity cost for both technical and non-technical 
degree holders, as career options at this point are extremely diverse, and time out of the 
cockpit is not as large an issue, due to the total time accumulated in operational flight 
billets. 
Non-Technical Graduate Degrees. Model Two in Table 5.3 shows four out of 
seven graduate education covariates to be significant and positive in the 
promotion/command screen equation. Earning a non-technical degree, at least one year 
before the Pay Grade 4 board is significant and positive, however the impact becomes 
insignificant once all controls are included in Model Three. Bivariate correlations show 
that officers earning a non-technical degree before the Pay Grade 4 board are more likely 
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to have higher early career performance ratings than officers without graduate degrees 
(the comparison category).   In essence, even though the effect of the coefficient is 
reduced, it is a less biased estimator, and better captures the positive (though statistically 
insignificant) effect of earning non-technical degree before the Pay Grade 4 board on 
promote/screen. Non-technical degrees earned either early or after the Pay Grade 4 board 
are never significant. There appears to be some measured benefit from earning a fully 
funded non-technical degree one year or less prior to the Pay Grade 4 board; however, it 
appears that officers who are superior performers early in their careers are selecting into 
the non-technical programs. Since many of these degrees are in management or policy- 
related majors, it is possible that the skills learned in these programs are perceived to 
translate well towards the managerial role an officer will fill as a squadron department 
head, shortly after this time period. (See Career Progression Chart, Chapter III). 
Technical Graduate Degrees. For the full-time technical degree holders, the 
coefficients for early and after the Pay Grade 4 board are positive and significant before 
any additional controls are introduced. When the various controls are added to the model 
the coefficient for full-time early becomes insignificant and drops in size. Only full-time 
after maintains its significant and positive effect. To select/be selected for funded 
graduate education after the Pay Grade 4 board is probably due in part to these officers 
having higher levels of human capital and in part due to a rational decision on the part of 
the Navy to only screen officers with command potential to obtain a graduate degree this 
late in a career.   The estimated impact of a technical graduate degree, earned after the 
Pay Grade 4 board does not vary much when other factors, including early career 
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performance, are controlled for in the model. It should be noted that only a small number 
of officers actually obtain full-time technical education after the Pay Grade 4 board, 
which further highlights the possibility of a positive selection/screening effect. 
Additionally, these officers may posses a higher motivation level or affective skill 
when compared to others. The effect of non-technical degrees earned at the same time in 
a career is insignificant. Furthermore, two separate logit regressions (see Appendix C) 
using "Technical Full-Time After" and "Non-Technical Full-Time After" as the 
dependent variables showed officers in the Technical Full-Time After category were 
more likely to serve in the squadron maintenance officer position. 
Utilization of a Fully-Funded Degree. This covariate controls for utilization of a 
P-Code prior to the Pay Grade 5 board. While the impact is negative and significant, it 
becomes positive and insignificant once other factors are controlled for in Model Two. 
Those officers who utilize their degree are more likely to promote/screen and with degree 
utilization included in the model, it partially explains the positive premium to full-time 
technical after and full-time non-technical before estimates, causing their coefficients to 
be reduced in size. Only 19 of the 186 officers with FFGE actually utilize their P-code, 
but these officers are at least as likely to promote/screen as officers without graduate 
degrees.10 
10
 Observed mean rate of promote/screen is 38.1% for officers without degrees. Officers who utilize their 
P-codes promote/screen at an observed rate of 36.8 percent. 
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The overall impact of utilization in the models shows that a utilization tour does 
not really hurt an officer's probability of promotion/command screen given they have 
good fitness report evaluations early in their career, holding all other factors constant. 
Part-Time Graduate Education. Perhaps the most interesting effect in the 
specifications is the resilience of the part-time graduate education variable. While the 
coefficient only has half of the effect of the full-time graduate education covariates, it 
remains significant and positive in all specifications. The effect of part-time graduate 
education is reduced by approximately 24% when all controls are included in the final 
model. However, when you consider that officers who earn graduate degrees on their 
own time are more likely to hold the good jobs in a squadron and are also more likely to 
be recommended for accelerated promotion in Pay Grade 3, it is possible that these 
officers have a higher level of motivation than other officers. This coupled with the 
lower associated opportunity costs of part-time graduate education make this a viable 
option for those interested in continuing an aviation career and increasing their own 
human capital. 
D.        MARGINAL EFFECTS 
To illustrate more clearly the effects of the independent variables in a logit 
regression, one may calculate the marginal effects for major covariates. For binary logit 
models, the logit coefficients are the log of the odds of a "1" outcome for the dependent 
variable (PROM_SCRN), holding constant the other variables. Since the coefficients are 
the log of the odds of the probability of promotion to Pay Grade 5/screen for squadron 
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command, some additional calculations are necessary to obtain the marginal effects of the 
independent variables. This is a four-step process (Bowman, 1998, p. 14): 
(1) Calculate Z = bk * x k, where: 
bk= logit coefficient for independent variable "k" and 
x k = intercept and mean values of independent variables 
(2) Calculate P(Y=l)=l/(l+e"z) 
(3) Calculate P(Y=0) = 1- P(Y=1) 
(4) Calculate "delta" (the marginal effect) = bk * [P(Y=1)*(1-P(Y=1)], or 
"marginal effect" = bk* (P*(l-P)) 
The calculations are performed with Excel™ and the results are displayed in the 
last column of Table 5.4. The calculations use the coefficients from Model Three in 
Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.4 - Marginal Effects of Promote/Screen 
VARIABLES3 X LOGIT x *LOGIT MARGINAL LOGITP(I-P) 
FFNTEARL 0.0216 -0.724 -0.0156 -15.50% 
FFNTBEF 0.0128 0.9489 0.0121 20.31% 
FFNTAFT+ 0.0272 -0.2283 -0.0062 -4.89% 
TECHEARL 0.0336 0.2911 0.0098 6.23% 
TECHBEF 0.0088 0.286 0.0025 6.12% 
TECHAFT+ 0.0136 1.1326 0.0154 24.25% 
PARTGRAD 0.2806 0.2653 0.0744 5.68% 
GRADES 2.7794 -0.1737 -0.4828 -3.72% 
BIOPHY 0.1407 -0.2492 -0.0351 -5.33% 
MATH 0.0695 0.2003 0.0139 4.29% 
SOCSCI 0.1815 0.0443 0.0080 0.95% 
HUMNEC 0.2574 -0.43 -0.1107 -9.21% 
BUSINESS 0.1855 0.3038 0.0563 6.50% 
ROTC 0.1799 -0.2133 -0.0384 -4.57% 
OCS 0.5084 -0.1596 -0.0811 -3.42% 
Prior Enlisted 0.0392 -0.804 -0.0315 -17.21% 
PILOT 0.6003 -0.0756 -0.0454 -1.62% 
MARO 1C 0.3293 0.7863 0.2590 16.83% 
MAR 2PLS 0.5340 1.0698 0.5712 22.90% 
ATTACK 0.3709 0.4118 0.1527 8.82% 
CSJET 0.2246 0.2819 0.0633 6.03% 
CSPROP 0.0855 -0.3717 -0.0318 -7.96% 
MAINTOFF 0.4628 0.6931 0.3208 14.84% 
OPSOFF 0.4492 0.6259 0.2812 13.40% 
EVERUSE 0.0160 0.3429 0.0055 7.34% 
PRAP3 0.4527 1.658 0.7506 35.49% 
-0.7979 =SUM x *LOGIT 
31.05%= Est. Prob of Promote/Screen: 
a. The marginal effects are based on the logit coefficients estimated in column 4 of Table 5.4. 
b. Significant covariates indicated in boldface. 
The marginal effects reflect the impact of each independent variable on the 
probability of the outcome (promote/screen), holding all others constant at their mean 
values. Officers without graduate degrees are the constant in each of the regression 
models, making the values of the regression covariates a direct comparison to officers 
without graduate degrees.   Table 5.4 and Figure 5.3 show that obtaining a technical 
95 
master's degree one or more years after the Pay Grade 4 board (TECHAFT+) increases 
the probability of promote/screen by 24.3 percentage points and completing a master's 
degree on one's own time (PART-TIME) increases an officers' chances by 5.7 percentage 
points when compared to officers without graduate degrees. 
Figure 5.3 
Marginal Effects of Graduate Education Covariates 
Evaluated at the Mean Values of X 
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E.        NOTIONAL PERSON 
Using Table 5.4 it is possible to directly assess the effects of different values of 
the independent variables on overall probability of promote/screen. By setting the X-bar 
values equal to '0' or '1' for dummy variables, we can calculate the overall effects of 
different types of graduate education on the probability of promote/screen. Figure 5.4 
displays the estimated probability of promote/screen given graduate degree type, timing, 
and technical specificity. The overall estimated probability of promote/screen when 
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calculated at the mean values of X is 31.05 percent, whereas the observed average value 
of promote/screen is 38.8 percent. 
Figure 5.4 
Estimated Probability of Promote/Screen for Pay Grade 4 
Officers by Graduate Degree Status (n=1,251) 
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Figure 5.5 below displays the marginal effects of graduate degrees when 
compared to officers without degrees. Officers without graduate education are estimated 
to have a 29.1% probability of promote/screen. This number serves as the baseline for 
computing the deltas and comparing graduate education covariates. Dark gray shading 
indicates statistically significant categories. Officers with a fully funded technical degree 
have a 26.9% better chance of promoting to Pay Grade 5/command screening than 
officers without graduate degrees (i.e., 56.0 minus 29.1). Officers who earned degrees on 
97 
their own time are 5.8% more likely to realize the promote/screen outcome than officers 
without degrees (i.e., 34.8 minus 29.1). 
Figure 5.5 
Marginal Effects of Graduate Education Covariates when 
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When one compares the differences between the regression marginal effects and 
the unadjusted mean values for promote/screen the regression effects appear to reduce the 
impact of graduate education. Figure 5.6 below illustrates this graphically. 
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Figure 5.6 
Estimated Effects of Graduate Education Compared to 
the Observed Effects of X (n=1,251) 
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F.        SUMMARY 
One value in performing regression analysis rather than calculating simple 
percentages is the ability to control for other factors. In the three model specifications we 
are able to evaluate the effects of other influences in an officer's career that make one 
officer different from the other, whether that is due to one's operational environment or 
individual behaviors. All of the variables in the final model have some statistical effect 
on officer performance. It is difficult to quantify behavioral characteristics, but through 
this analysis we are able to determine that graduate education for fixed-winged naval 
aviators does not hurt one's chances for advancement in a naval career and for some may 
enhance their chances for promotion and screening for command. 
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VI.      CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis examines the effects of graduate education on the joint outcome of 
promoting to commander and screening for squadron command for carrier-based, fixed- 
wing aviators. Logit models indicate that officers who earn a graduate degree one or 
more years after the Pay Grade 4 board in a technical program, have a 26.9 percentage 
point greater chance to promote/screen than officers without a degree. Furthermore, 
officers who earn a graduate degree on their own time have a 5.8 percentage point better 
chance to promote/screen than officers without a degree. These two findings are 
evidence of a direct benefit realized by officers in these types of degree programs. 
However, the most significant finding of this study is that in no instance does 
fully funded graduate education hurt one's career. The community of carrier-based fixed- 
wing aviation is chosen as the basis for this study due to perceptions throughout this 
community that time spent away from flying duty can be detrimental to one's career. The 
opportunity cost of attending fully funded graduate education can be significant when an 
officer is removed from a flying billet and also receives 2 to 3 years of unobserved, non- 
competitive fitness reports. But the statistical models demonstrate that even when 
controls for prior performance, personal background, and Navy experiences are accounted 
for, the coefficients for graduate education never become negative and significant. If 
funded graduate degrees and graduate degrees earned on officers' own time do not 
adversely affect a naval career, then a reasonable assertion is that graduate education is 
definitely beneficial to the naval officer. 
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When considering the benefits realized by the Navy, an earlier study (Cymrot & 
Cavalluzzo, 1998) called into question the benefits of P-code utilization, due to the low 
rates of actual utilization of funded graduate education. In this data, only 10.2% of the 
186 aviators with FFGE utilized their degree prior to the Pay Grade 5 board. The overall 
impact of utilization in the models shows that a utilization tour does not really hurt an 
officer's probability of promotion/command screen given they have good fitness report 
evaluations early in their career, holding all other factors constant. The officers who 
utilize a degree are at least as likely to promote/screen as officers without graduate 
degrees, reinforcing the importance of good performance in an assigned billet. 
Mean values of promotion rates and representation at flag rank are also common 
metrics used to justify or rebuke the need for graduate education. The fundamental 
problem with these methods lies in their limited ability to measure human behavior. 
For a line community such as carrier aviation, methods of problem solving and 
employing the operational art of strike warfare often lie in variances of human behavior. 
The indirect benefit of graduate education is in its effect on problem solving, applying 
new approaches to old problems, or even exposure to different philosophies on 
management styles. This is a broad concept, but it highlights the difficulties of placing an 
absolute metric on the value of education. 
The Navy realizes a direct benefit in officer retention due to the increased 
commitment incurred from attending a funded graduate education program. The 
immeasurable effect comes from officers early in their career who view the option of 
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funded graduate education as a reason to prolong a naval career, if only to bolster 
personal skill levels before entering the civilian world. 
This study has demonstrated that graduate education is beneficial to the officer if 
for no other reason than achieving a higher level of education on a full scholarship, in 
addition to salary and non-pecuniary benefits. The benefit is further realized when an 
officer can fit graduate education into a career without fear of decreasing opportunity 
when compared to their peers without graduate degrees. 
A.       POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
As a result of the findings in this thesis, several policy recommendations appear to 
be warranted. 
1) Continue to make graduate education, of all kinds, available to all officers. 
This especially applies to the unrestricted line communities. Due to the significance of 
earning a graduate degree on one's own time, the Navy should expand funding 
opportunities for distance education and make graduate level courses available on ships 
and shore installations, similar to the current distance learning opportunities afforded 
enlisted personnel. Current programs allow officers to work on graduate courses, but 
only during off-duty hours while in a shore-based billet. 
2) Continue to sponsor the Naval Postgraduate School as the flagship higher 
learning institution in the Navy. While earning a graduate degree through distance 
learning technology has its advantages, it does not replace the effect of total immersion in 
a graduate studies program. The NPS still has a valid role in providing naval-relevant 
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courses of study that benefit the Navy in the way of applied student projects and master's 
theses. 
3) Explore new ways to make graduate education beneficial to both the officer and 
the Navy. The Leadership, Education, and Development (LEAD) program for 
prospective company officers at the United States Naval Academy is an example of one 
such program. After one year of immersion, officers immediately utilize their degree as 
USNA company officers. Perhaps executive MBA-type courses could be implemented 
for prospective department heads or commanding officers. These courses could be taught 
at a central facility or use video-teleconferencing technologies to create a virtual 
classroom with participants based around the world. 
B.        RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis has examined the effects of fully funded graduate education on 
promotion/command screen. Follow-on research should focus on a similar evaluation of 
graduate education using more recent data through 2000. This will be especially relevant 
due to current and projected manpower shortages throughout the fleet since the 
drawdown of the mid-nineties. Another area for future analysis involves a survey of past 
and present aviation department heads, commanding officers, and air wing commanders 
with graduate degrees and assess the perceived benefits or disadvantages that a master's 
degree provides during an operational tour in a position of leadership. 
The bottom line is the Navy is in a position to expand its present capabilities by 
drawing on the talents of its officers. By focusing its efforts on education, as well as 
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training, the Navy can truly promote an environment of lifelong learning and realize its 
full potential as the force of the future. 
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APPENDIX A: BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS 
This appendix contains bivariate correlations of covariates used in Table 5.3. This 
was to test for possible significant correlation between the PRAP3 covariate and others 
included in the final logit model. 




CR FFNTEARL    FFNTBEF    FFNTAFT1    NOGRAD 
PRAP3 Pearson Correlation 1.000 .301" .071* -.001 .028 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .012 .960 .323 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
• Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 




PROM_SCR Pearson Correlation .301" 1.000 -.031 .053 .005 -.040 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .275 .062 .869 .154 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
FFNTEARL Pearson Correlation .071* -.031 1.000 -.017 -.025 -.171" 
Sig. (2-tailed) .012 .275 .550 .380 .000 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
FFNTBEF Pearson Correlation -.001 .053 -.017 1.000 -.019 -.131" 
Sig. (2-tailed) .960 .062 .550 .501 .000 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
FFNTAFT1 Pearson Correlation .028 .005 -.025 -.019 1.000 -.193" 
Sig. (2-tailed) .323 .869 .380 .501 .000 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
NOGRAD Pearson Correlation -.051 -.040 -.171" -.131" -.193" 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .070 .154 .000 .000 .000 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
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Correlations 
PROM S TECHEA 
PRAP3 CR RL TECHBEF TECHAFT1 NOGRAD 
PRAP3 Pearson Correlation 1.000 .274" -.003 -.026 .015 -.046 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .916 .322 .559 .083 
N 1423 1423 1423 1423 1423 1423 
PROM_SCR Pearson Correlation .274" 1.000 .034 .042 .077** -.067** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .145 .075 .001 .004 
N 1423 1817 1817 1817 1817 1817 
TECHEARL Pearson Correlation -.003 .034 1.000 -.015 -.024 -.190" 
Sig. (2-tailed) .916 .145 .522 .312 .000 
N 1423 1817 1817 1817 1817 1817 
TECHBEF Pearson Correlation -.026 .042 -.015 1.000 -.013 -.105" 
Sig. (2-tailed) .322 .075 .522 .575 .000 
N 1423 1817 1817 1817 1817 1817 
TECHAFT1 Pearson Correlation .015 .077** -.024 -.013 1.000 -.167" 
Sig. (2-tailed) .559 .001 .312 .575 .000 
N 1423 1817 1817 1817 1817 1817 
NOGRAD Pearson Correlation -.046 -.067" -.190" -.105" -.167" 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .083 .004 .000 .000 .000 
N 1423 1817 1817 1817 1817 1817 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Correlations 
PROM S 
CR PRAP3 APC1 
PROM_SCR Pearson Correlation 1.000 .301" -.065' 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .021 
N 1251 1251 1251 
PRAP3 Pearson Correlation .301** 1.000 -.077" 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .006 
N 1251 1251 1251 
APC1 Pearson Correlation -.065* -.077** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .021 .006 
N 1251 1251 1251 
• Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Correlations 
PROM S ENGINEE 
CR PRAP3 R MATH BIOPHY SOCSCI BUSINESS HUMNEC 
PROM_SCR Pearson Correlation 1.000 .301" -.033 .028 -.038 -.002 .049 -.001 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .250 .322 .181 .956 .084 .981 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
PRAP3 Pearson Correlation .301" 1.000 -.060* -.025 .003 -.003 .039 .031 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .033 .379 .905 .902 .167 .266 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
ENGINEER Pearson Correlation -.033 -.060* 1.000 -.122" -.180" -.210** -.212" -.262" 
Sig. (2-tailed) .250 .033 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
MATH Pearson Correlation .028 -.025 -.122" 1.000 -.111" -.129" -.130" -.161" 
Sig. (2-tailed) .322 .379 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
BIOPHY Pearson Correlation -.038 .003 -.180" -.111" 1.000 -.191" -.193" -.238" 
Sig. (2-tailed) .181 .905 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
SOCSCI Pearson Correlation -.002 -.003 -.210" -.129" -.191" 1.000 -.225" -.277" 
Sig. (2-tailed) .956 .902 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
BUSINESS Pearson Correlation .049 .039 -.212" -.130" -.193" -.225" 1.000 -.281" 
Sig. (2-tailed) .084 .167 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 









• Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 





















CR PRAP3 ROTC_R OCS ENL RES USNA 
PROM_SCR Pearson Correlation 1.000 .301" .010 -.023 -.063* .045 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 .715 .407 .025 .112 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
PRAP3 Pearson Correlation .301" 1.000 -.035 .014 -.037 .031 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .212 .628 .194 .272 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
-.095** 
1251 
ROTC_R Pearson Correlation .010 -.035 1.000 -.476" -.287" 
Sig. (2-tailed) .715 .212 .000 .001 .000 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
-.205** 
1251 
OCS Pearson Correlation -.023 .014 -.476" 1.000 -.623" 
Sig. (2-tailed) .407 .628 .000 .000 .000 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
1.000 
1251 
ENL_RES Pearson Correlation -.063* -.037 -.095" -.205" -.124" 
Sig. (2-tailed) .025 .194 .001 .000 .000 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
USNA Pearson Correlation .045 .031 -.287" -.623" -.124" 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .112 .272 .000 .000 .000 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
• Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 




CR PRAP3 ATTACK CSJET CSPROP FIGHTER 
PROM_SCR Pearson Correlation 1.000 .301" .058* .012 -.085" -.020 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .039 .664 .003 .470 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
PRAP3 Pearson Con-elation .301" 1.000 -.037 -.024 .001 .059* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .190 .402 .963 .037 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
ATTACK Pearson Correlation .058* -.037 1.000 -.413" -.235** -.525** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .039 .190 .000 .000 .000 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
CSJET Pearson Correlation .012 -.024 -.413" 1.000 -.165" -.368** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .664 .402 .000 .000 .000 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
CSPROP Pearson Correlation -.085" .001 -.235** -.165" 1.000 -.209** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .963 .000 .000 .000 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
FIGHTER Pearson Correlation -.020 .059* -.525** -.368** -.209" 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .470 .037 .000 .000 .000 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
"• Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 






S MAR0 1C SING DIV 
PROM_SCR Pearson Correlation 1.000 .301** .151** -.004 -.100** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
.000 .000 .901 .000 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
PRAP3 Pearson Correlation .301" 1.000 .080** .005 -.043 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .005 .869 .129 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 
-.689** 
1251 
MAR_2PLS Pearson Correlation .151** .080** 1.000 -.302** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .005 .000 .000 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 
1.000 
1251 
MAR0_1C Pearson Correlation -.004 .005 -.689** -.223** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .901 .869 .000 .000 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
SING_DIV Pearson Correlation -.100** -.043 -.302** -.223** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .129 .000 .000 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 




CR PRAP3 P1 PILOT MAINTOFF OPSOFF 
PROM_SCR Pearson Correlation 1.000 .301** -.023 .192** .155** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .412 .000 .000 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
PRAP3 Pearson Correlation .301** 1.000 -.002 .048 .092** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .952 .093 .001 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 
.014 
1251 
P1 PILOT Pearson Correlation -.023 -.002 1.000 -.008 
Sig. (2-tailed) .412 .952 .610 .783 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
MAINTOFF Pearson Correlation .192** .048 .014 1.000 .025 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .093 .610 .369 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
OPSOFF Pearson Correlation .155** .092** -.008 .025 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .001 .783 .369 
N 1251 1251 1251 1251 1251 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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APPENDIX B: FIVE-STEP REGRESSION TABLE 
This appendix contains a five-step regression table which highlights the impacts 
to graduate education coefficients as controls for self-selection, as well as pre- and post- 
commissioning factors are added to the model. 
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Table A-l - Dependent Variable = Promote/Screen1 "•' 
Variables  1 2 3 4 



















(0.254) (0.363) (0.372) (0.409) 



















(0.342) (0.502) (0.507) (0.58) 
PARTGRAD        0.59***      0.486*** 0.506*** 0.265* 
 (0.120)      (0.133) (0.137) (0.156) 
EVERUSE 0.029 0.206 0.319 0.343 
(0.491)      (0.519) (0.548) (0.567) 
APC1 - -0.132* -0.127* -0.174** 
(0.068) (0.07) (0.082) 





























(0.202) (0.207) (0.235) 















(0.353) (0.363) (0.425) 
MAR0 1C 0.935*** 0.875*** 0.786*** 
(0.196) (0.199) (0.229) 
MAR 2PLS 1.174*** 1.117*** 1.070*** 
(0.187) (0.191) (0.22) 
PILOT - -0.104 -0.076 
(0.124) (0.142) 
ATTACK8 - - 0.252* 0.412* 
(0.144) (0.167) 
CSJET - - 0.165 0.282 
(0.163) (0.189) 
CSPROP            -               -               -0.437* -0.372 
(0.252) (0.29) 
MAINTOFF - - 0.644*** 0.693*** 
(0.119) (0.138) 
OPSOFF             -                -                0.513*** 0.626*** 
(0.118) (0.137) 
PRAP3                - 1.658*** 
(0.184) 
Constant -1.055 -1.147        -1.849 -2.334 
-2 Log Likelihood 2181.339   1767.171   1706.983 1305.704 
n=1.817    n=1,522     n=1.522 n=1.251 
gj
      Standard Errors in parentheses 
h
-      All models incorporate fiscal year dummies with FY84 as the omitted category. 
j-       Statisctical significance indicated as follows: *=0.10, **=0.05, ***=0.01. 
'•       Engineering major is the omitted category. 
L
      USNA is the omitted category. 
'•       Single/Divorced is the omitted category. 
m
      Fighter community is the omitted category. 
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APPENDIX C: REGRESSIONS FOR GRADUATE DEGREES EARNED ONE TO 
FOUR YEARS AFTER THE PAY GRADE 4 BOARD 
This appendix contains the two regressions to analyze any potential differences 
between a technical and non-technical degree earned one to four years after the Pay Grade 
4 board. 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ON FFNTAFT+ 
Total number of cases: 
Number of selected cases: 




Number of selected cases: 325 
Number rejected because of missing data:  139 
Number of cases included in the analysis: 186 
Dependent Variable. FFNTAFT1 
-2 Log Likelihood  176.92557 
* Constant is included in the model. 
Variable B 
-  vet L1CUJ1C 
S.E. 
3  X 11 uiie c 
Wald df Sig R Exp(B) 
PR0MFY81 7.0015 30 .7307 .0519 1 .8198 .0000 1098.2771 
PROMFY82 6.3227 30 .7346 .0423 1 .8370 .0000 557.0907 
PROMFY83 6.2696 30 .7304 .0416 1 .8383 .0000 528.2576 
PROMFY84 6.5565 30 .7352 .0455 1 .8311 .0000 703.8247 
PROMFY85 5.7639 30 .7325 .0352 1 .8512 .0000 318.5888 
PROMFY86 6.2053 30 .7304 .0408 1 .8400 .0000 495.3443 
PR0MFY87 6.5447 30 .7337 .0453 1 .8314 .0000 695.5266 
PROMFY88 5.5884 30 .7320 .0331 1 .8557 .0000 267.3084 
APC1 -.7127 .2943 5 .8658 1 .0154 -.1478 .4903 
BIOPHY -.6486 .8610 .5676 1 .4512 .0000 .5228 
MATH 
-.2723 .7824 .1211 1 .7278 .0000 .7616 
SOCSCI -8.2333 19 .3129 .1817 1 .6699 .0000 .0003 
HUMNEC -.9863 .6975 1 .9996 1 .1573 .0000 .3729 
BUSINESS -2.0421 1 2693 2 .5884 1 .1076 -.0577 .1298 
ROTC_R -.3126 6398 .2388 1 .6251 .0000 .7315 
OCS -1.9837 8088 6 .0154 1 .0142 -.1506 .1376 
ENL_RES -.6914 1 0505 .4332 1 .5104 .0000 .5009 
P1PIL0T -.1907 5101 .1397 1 .7086 .0000 .8264 
MAR0_1C -1.2014 7729 2 .4161 1 .1201 -.0485 .3008 
MAR_2PLS .0006 6719 .0000 1 1.0000 .0000 1.0006 
ATTACK -1.1742 5643 4 .3301 1 .0374 -.1148 .3091 
CSJET -.7405 6655 1 .2380 1 .2659 .0000 .4769 
CSPROP -1.8743 1 2579 2 .2201 1 .1362 -.0353 .1535 
MAINTOFF .2281 4946 .2126 1 .6447 .0000 1.2562 
OPSOFF .3687 4883 .5699 1 .4503 .0000 1.4458 
EVERUSE .0667 9858 .0046 1 .9460 .0000 1.0690 
PRAP3 .3367 5868 .3292 1 .5661 .0000 1.4003 
Constant -4.0970 30 7462 .0178 1 .8940 
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LOGISTIC REGRESSION ON TECHAFT+ 
Total number of cases: 
Number of selected cases: 




Number of selected cases: 325 
Number rejected because of missing data:  139 
Number of cases included in the analysis: 186 
Dependent Variable.. TECHAFT1 
-2 Log Likelihood  113.74274 




in tne E 
Wald 
quation 
df Sig R Exp(B) 
PR0MFY81 9.9854 87.8018 .0129 1 .9095 .0000 21706.358 
PROMFY82 10.0905 87.8011 .0132 1 .9085 .0000 24113.345 
PROMFY83 .3383 103.4270 .0000 1 .9974 .0000 1.4026 
PROMFY84 9.204S 87.8058 .0110 1 .9165 .0000 9942.7802 
PROMFY85 9.8831 87.8045 .0127 1 .9104 .0000 19596.521 
PROMFY86 9.802S 87.8021 .0125 1 .9111 .0000 18080.543 
PROMFY87 8.8725 87.8060 .0102 1 .9195 .0000 7133.1657 
PROMFY88 9.1345 87.8033 .0108 1 .9171 .0000 9269.4909 
APC1 
-.651S .4751 1.8813 1 .1702 .0000 .5212 
BIOPHY 7.S658 39.8150 .0371 1 .8473 .0000 2134.0226 
MATH 7.8816 39.8133 .0392 1 .8431 .0000 2647.9835 
SOCSCI 10.2894 39.8034 .0668 1 .7960 .0000 29418.929 
HDMNEC 8.2056 39.8049 .0425 1 .8367 .0000 3661.2761 
BUSINESS 9.4951 39.8056 .0569 1 .8115 .0000 13293.807 
ROTC_R .5119 1.0025 .2607 1 .6096 .0000 1.6684 
OCS .2447 .9001 .0739 1 .7858 .0000 1.2772 
ENL_RES 
-8.3808 67.1839 .0156 1 .9007 .0000 .0002 
P1PIL0T 
-.3202 .6940 .2128 1 .6445 .0000 .7260 
MAR0_1C 1.5479 1.0819 2.0470 1 .1525 .0203 4.7014 
MAR_2PLS .5848 .9762 .3588 1 .5491 .0000 1.7946 
ATTACK 
-.3945 .8497 .2156 1 .6424 .0000 .6740 
CSJET 
-.3468 .9910 .1225 1 .7264 .0000 .7069 
CSPROP .7289 1.1572 .3968 1 .5287 .0000 2.0729 
MAINTOFF 1.2697 .7421 2.9274 1 .0871 .0903 3.5597 
OPSOFF 
-.1696 .6891 .0606 1 .8056 .0000 .8440 
EVERUSE .3318 1.1711 .0803 1 .7769 .0000 1.3935 
PRAP3 
- .3930 .8114 .2346 1 .6282 .0000 .6750 
Constant -19.9445 96.4060 .0428 1 .8361 
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APPENDIX D: T-TESTS 




GRAD3CAT N Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
PROM_SCR FFGE 186 .3763 .4858 .0356 













ENGINEER FFGE 186 .2097 .4082 .0299 
None 714 .1695 .3754 .0141 
MATH FFGE 186 .1022 .3037 .0223 
None 714 .0630 .2432 .0091 
BIOPHY FFGE 186 .0968 .2964 .0217 
None 714 .1373 .3444 .0129 
SOCSCI FFGE 186 .1129 .3173 .0233 
None 714 .1919 .3941 .0147 
BUSINESS FFGE 186 .1398 .3477 .0255 
None 714 .2213 .4154 .0155 
HUMNEC FFGE 186 .3387 .4745 .0348 













source-ocs FFGE 186 .3333 .4727 .0347 
None 714 .5574 .4970 .0186 
source-enl reserve other FFGE 186 .0591 .2365 .0173 
None 714 .0350 .1839 .0069 
source-usna FFGE 186 .3871 .4884 .0358 
None 714 .2479 .4321 .0162 
MAR_2PLS FFGE 186 .5753 .4956 .0363 
None 714 .4930 .5003 .0187 
MAR0_1C FFGE 186 .3065 .4623 .0339 
None 714 .3529 .4782 .0179 
SING_DIV FFGE 186 .1129 .3173 .0233 
None 714 .0952 .2937 .0110 
ATTACK FFGE 186 .4247 .4956 .0363 
None 714 .3641 .4815 .0180 
CSJET FFGE 186 .1882 .3919 .0287 
None 714 .2367 .4254 .0159 
CSPROP FFGE 186 .0914 .2890 .0212 
None 714 .0798 .2712 .0102 
FIGHTER FFGE 186 .2957 .4576 .0336 
None 714 .3193 .4665 .0175 












N1NFO FFGE 186 .4140 .4939 .0362 
None 714 .4188 .4937 .0185 
MAINTOFF FFGE 186 .3817 .4871 .0357 
None 714 .4734 .4996 .0187 
OPSOFF FFGE 186 .4194 .4948 .0363 
None 714 .4468 .4975 .0186 
PRAP3 FFGE 186 .4559 .4122 .0302 
None 714 .4356 ,3781 .0141 
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Group Statistics 
GRAD3CAT N Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
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